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| War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism | 
 enlarge | Author: Douglas J. Feith
Publisher: Harper
Category: Book
List Price: $27.95
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Avg. Customer Rating:  40 reviews
Sales Rank: 60115
Media: Hardcover
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 688
Shipping Weight (lbs): 2.1
Dimensions (in): 9.2 x 6 x 1.7
ISBN: 0060899735
Dewey Decimal Number: 973.931
EAN: 9780060899738
ASIN: 0060899735
Publication Date: March 1, 2008
Availability: Usually ships in 1-2 business days
Condition: Clean, crisp, unmarked copy in great condition, has hardly been used. Ships fast!
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Product Description
In the years since the attacks of September 11, 2001, journalists, commentators, and others have published accounts of the Bush Administration's war on terrorism. But no senior Pentagon official has offered an inside view of those years, or has challenged the prevailing narrative of that war—until now. Douglas J. Feith, the head of the Pentagon's Policy organization, was a key member of Donald Rumsfeld's inner circle as the Administration weighed how to protect the nation from another 9/11. In War and Decision, he puts readers in the room with President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Condoleezza Rice, Colin Powell, General Tommy Franks, and other key players as the Administration devised its strategy and war plans. Drawing on thousands of previously undisclosed documents, notes, and other written sources, Feith details how the Administration launched a global effort to attack and disrupt terrorist networks; how it decided to overthrow the Saddam Hussein regime; how it came to impose an occupation on Iraq even though it had avoided one in Afghanistan; how some officials postponed or impeded important early steps that could have averted major problems in Iraq's post-Saddam period; and how the Administration's errors in war-related communications undermined the nation's credibility and put U.S. war efforts at risk. Even close followers of reporting on the Iraq war will be surprised at the new information Feith provides—presented here with balance and rigorous attention to detail. Among other revelations, War and Decision demonstrates that the most far-reaching warning of danger in Iraq was produced not by State or by the CIA, but by the Pentagon. It reveals the actual story behind the allegations that the Pentagon wanted to "anoint" Ahmad Chalabi as ruler of Iraq, and what really happened when the Pentagon challenged the CIA's work on the Iraq-al Qaida relationship. It offers the first accurate account of Iraq postwar planning—a topic widely misreported to date. And it presents surprising new portraits of Rumsfeld, Rice, Powell, Richard Armitage, L. Paul Bremer, and others—revealing how differences among them shaped U.S. policy. With its blend of vivid narrative, frank analysis, and elegant writing, War and Decision is like no other book on the Iraq war. It will interest those who have been troubled by conflicting accounts of the planning of the war, frustrated by the lack of firsthand insight into the decision-making process, or skeptical of conventional wisdom about Operation Iraqi Freedom and the global war on terrorism—efforts the author continues to support.
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| Customer Reviews: Read 35 more reviews...
 An excellent personal memoir April 27, 2008
200 out of 229 found this review helpful
I have now finished the book but the number of negative reviews posted here still suggests that half a review by someone who has read the book carefully was better than what else is on offer so far. I have not altered my comments since reading the rest but have a few additional observations. This is a personal story of Feith's career in the DoD, before and during the Iraq War. He comments on contacts with others but he does not offer general statements or philosophy about matters that he is not personally familiar with. He does, however, offer some conclusions at the end about what was done well and what the mistakes were. He is honest about identifying his opinions and what he believes to be facts. This is a source document for the history that will be eventually written, hopefully fairly, about this period. I marked a number of sections because they impact the mythology of the war as illustrated in the other reviews and comments.
He is critical of Colin Powell, and especially, Richard Armitage, who seemed not to be as concerned with the post-Saddam situation yet who resisted anyone else treading on their turf. His first skirmish was in 2002 (page 173) when he attempted to set up an office, called Office of Strategic Influence, to counteract the Islamist propaganda about why violent jihad was becoming a threat. Some went back to the old "root causes" excuse yet the Saudi hijackers of 9/11 were upper middle class educated men. His effort came to naught when the office was attacked in a strategic leak from within the administration, followed by a sensational NY Times article that accused them of planning to spread false information. Another similar article was printed recently about another DoD effort to reach Muslims with honest information. In his conclusions, he points out that we still do not have any serious effort to counter jihadist rhetoric.
He refutes (page 197) another charge, prominent in another review here, that Chalabi was a "creature" of DoD and Feith was his "sponsor." One would think that the fact the Chalabi has been a major official in the Iraq government would put to rest that old CIA smear but it lives on on Amazon pages. He tells the story of CIA incompetence and the firestorm created when a 20-year DIA expert on his staff wrote a critical briefing (page 265) pointing out how CIA had ignored links between Saddam and al Qeada before the war. On page 278, he recounts another example of State's conflicted thinking where they advise against an "occupation" but their antipathy toward the "externals" (exiles like Chalabi) leads them to plan for a "many year" occupation and rule before an Iraqi government can be set up. The insurgency gained force from resentment at that policy. He points out with some understandable satisfaction that the "externals," including the Kurds who CIA predicted would not be accepted by other Iraqis, constituted almost the entire interim government that took over from Bremer and the CPA in 2004.
He has some mixed opinions about Paul Bremer, pointing out how Bremer took too much authority, resisting any consultation with Rumsfeld, his superior in the chain-of-command, and made a number of serious mistakes. The most serious one was excluding the Iraqis from governing their own country for as long as he did. The insurgency might never have gained the support of so much of the Sunni population had the "Occupation" not been so obvious.
I don't say this is the last word and Feith seems to resist many generalizations. This is an objective account and very valuable. He has his deficiencies. The most serious is the fact the he never mentions the tribal nature of the Iraqi society. This was a major mistake in the early history of our post-Saddam attempts to govern the country and fight the insurgency.
I have read many books on this subject and the ones I respect, beginning with The Threatening Storm by Kenneth Pollack, all mostly agree. For example, another review here mentions Bob Baer and his book about Aghanistan and Gary Berntsen and "Jawbreaker" also about Afghanistan. I have read both books and Baer, in particular, dismisses his CIA bosses pointing out the lack of language skills in CIA. This lack, and the ignorance of the culture, was a major factor in the CIAs poor performance in Iraq and is discussed by Feith. He is chiefly critical of CIA implying that their information was better sourced than it was. They concealed how few assets they had in Iraq (none) and led others astray who placed more faith in their reports than was warranted. Better to confess ignorance than mislead.
The dissent, like some of the other reviews here, comes with plenty of invective and obscenity but few facts. I still think this is an important book that anyone trying to understand our policy on fighting militant Islam should read. I'm sure Feith is evening a few scores here but he marshals lots of facts and refers to other documents to support his conclusions. This is an essential book, not least because he is such a controversial figure. The abuse he has taken from partisans is outrageous. At one point (page 388) he mentions a particularly odious slur attributed to Colin Powell by Bob Woodward in which Feith's office in the DoD is described as "a Gestapo office" ignoring the fact that Feith's father was a Holocaust survivor. Powell denied making the remark and apologized to Feith, whom he had known for 20 years, but the tone was set.
Looking Back not Reflecting April 10, 2008
90 out of 124 found this review helpful
This book is an absolutely fascinating look into the chain of reasoning following 9/11 that led to the declaration of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), the most tangible manifestation of which has been Operation Iraqi Freedom. Up front Feith presents his (and apparently Rumsfled's) theory that, "All organizations involved in international terrorism could be considered in partnership with others in that business (i.e. terrorism)" apparently regardless of religion, motivations or targets. Feith later (page 229) explains this network as incorporating al Qaeda, other Islamic `Jihadists' and non-Islamic Groups. The GWOT then is literally that, a U.S. world war against all groups using terrorism as their principal tactic as well as any state that sponsors them. Feith then identifies the principal strategic goal of the GWOT as to prevent another catastrophic attack against the U.S. or its interests. This apparently is the source of the administration doctrine of preemptive war or "anticipatory self-defense" as Feith calls it. Following this logic, Saddam Hussein's Iraq was identified as a state sponsor of terror and also a threat to U.S National Security in its own right. If Feith is accurate, this was the driving force behind Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Now Feith also provides the reader with some really intriguing though not necessarily accurate accounts of the deliberations that went on in the build up to Operation Iraqi Freedom and its immediate aftermath. By his own account, Feith was a strong backer of Ahmad Chalabi and his Iraqi National Congress as the government in exile best suited to take over after the fall Saddam Hussein. His faith in what he calls "Iraqi Externals" was apparently boundless.
Feith also expresses his extreme dissatisfaction with the intelligence provided by CIA prior to the war. He denies that he ever claimed that Saddam Hussein was behind the 9/11 attack, but he did claim that Iraqi was a state sponsor of terrorists. For this reason he agreed with his superior, Paul Wolfowitz that an Iraq-al Qaeda connection ought to be looked into as their feeling was that CIA was not willing to do so. To this end he directed a loan-in analyst from DIA to conduct a review of all the intelligence on this connection. The analyst literally did this by compiling a list of all the reporting that indicated an Iraqi-al Qaeda connection. But in what could called an incredible omission, the analyst failed to compile a similar list of the reporting that contradicted those reports or indeed to subject the reports that had been compiled to any sort of critical analysis. This is pretty well how Feith conducted all of his official business.
Feith is a reasonably good writer, but he appears utterly unreflective and arrogant. Yet his book does provide unique insights on why Iraq was considered so important to the GWOT.
A Drink In the Desert May 3, 2008
74 out of 99 found this review helpful
At last, a sensible, informed history from one of the responsible participants in these events.
I think it is skilfully written and I found it a joy to read, not just for the language mastery and informed history, but for the careful clarity, perspective, humility and sensitive care in purpose. I think it is a valuable insight into some truly capable people in action; standing up, discerning and doing the right thing, and doing their best, even when its really challenging, even when there is voluminous opposition, and when the stakes are very, very high. People who will find a way to rise and meet a challenge no matter how high, and some who don't. I found it exciting and inspiring to read, and a wonderful example of how to behave well that I will treasure.
Clearly, the integrity of the free world was in some fine hands here.
I loved it. Thanks.
Finally! A narative not painted by Bush-haters! April 26, 2008
71 out of 115 found this review helpful
Fascinating view of the first years of our War on Terrorism. Only Bush seems to make decisions based on the fact that our enemies had discovered how to fight their enemy (the USA) by bypassing our military and attacking citizens directly. Why the MSM doesn't understand that protecting us from such attacks has to be the main function of our Presidency is beyond me.
. . only their hatred for our country and hope for its downfall can explain the anti-war behavior. Noone wants war but to pretend it's not necessary is foolhardy. Bush's main goal (according to Feith) is that we not suffer another attack and in that he's been successful. I for one am grateful to President Bush for that. Feith finds errors on all sides (state dept, Defense Dept. but he's gives a full narrative not just the soundbitten biased report we now expect from the mainstream media. Anyone interested in the real story must read this book!
 Boring, Tendentious, Self-serving April 9, 2008
63 out of 254 found this review helpful
Douglas Feith was one of the key architects of the war. His Office of Special Projects was responsible for manipulating the intelligence in such a way that he could defeat skeptics like Powell, Tenet and the American people.
In this endless snoozer, he apologizes for nothing and argues that if the war he had planned had actually been implemented, all would be well.
His disrespect for the military is glaring. At every step of the way the brass had serious problems and reservations but Feith, Harvard educated, knew he was smarter and ignored the brass.
But this is a book so it rises or falls on its readability. This is the most boring book ever. I only read it because I had to (job reasons). If you don't have to, read Tenet's or one of the other memoirs of the Iraq debacle. You'll never get through this one.
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