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| The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War | 
 enlarge | Author: David Halberstam
Publisher: Hyperion
Category: Book
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Avg. Customer Rating:  128 reviews
Sales Rank: 3279
Media: Hardcover
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 736
Shipping Weight (lbs): 2.4
Dimensions (in): 9.4 x 6.5 x 2
ISBN: 1401300529
Dewey Decimal Number: 951.904240973
EAN: 9781401300524
ASIN: 1401300529
Publication Date: September 25, 2007
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Book Description
David Halberstam's magisterial and thrilling The Best and the Brightest was the defining book for the Vietnam War. More than three decades later, Halberstam used his unrivalled research and formidable journalistic skills to shed light on another dark corner in our history: the Korean War. The Coldest Winter is a successor to The Best and the Brightest, even though in historical terms it precedes it. Halberstam considered The Coldest Winter the best book he ever wrote, the culmination of forty-five years of writing about America's postwar foreign policy. Up until now, the Korean War has been the black hole of modern American history. The Coldest Winter changes that. Halberstam gives us a masterful narrative of the political decisions and miscalculations on both sides. He charts the disastrous path that led to the massive entry of Chinese forces near the Yalu, and that caught Douglas MacArthur and his soldiers by surprise. He provides astonishingly vivid and nuanced portraits of all the major figures -- Eisenhower, Truman, Acheson, Kim, and Mao, and Generals MacArthur, Almond, and Ridgway. At the same time, Halberstam provides us with his trademark highly evocative narrative journalism, chronicling the crucial battles with reportage of the highest order. At the heart of the book are the individual stories of the soldiers on the front lines who were left to deal with the consequences of the dangerous misjudgments and competing agendas of powerful men. We meet them, follow them, and see some of the most dreadful battles in history through their eyes. As ever, Halberstam was concerned with the extraordinary courage and resolve of people asked to bear an extraordinary burden. The Coldest Winter is contemporary history in its most literary and luminescent form, and provides crucial perspective on the Vietnam War and the events of today. It was a book that Halberstam first decided to write more than thirty years ago and that took him nearly ten years to write. It stands as a lasting testament to one of the greatest journalists and historians of our time, and to the fighting men whose heroism it chronicles. Includes an Afterword by Russell Baker Tributes to David Halberstam David Halberstam died at the age of 73 in a car accident in California on April 23, 2007, just after completing The Coldest Winter. Legendary for his work ethic, his kindness to young writers, and his unbending moral spine, Halberstam had friends and admirers throughout journalism, many of whom spoke at his memorial service and at readings across the country for the release of The Coldest Winter. We have included testimonials given at his memorial service by two writers who made their reputations at the same newspaper where he won a Pulitzer Prize for his Vietnam War reporting, The New York Times: Anna Quindlen ...David occupied a lot of space on the planet. Perhaps he felt the price he must pay for that big voice, that big reach, that big reputation, was that his generosity had to be just as large. Most of us, when we take to the road and meet admiring strangers, vow afterward to answer the note pressed into our hands or to pass along the speech we promised to the person whose daughter couldn't be there to hear it. But with the best will in the world we arrive home to deadlines, bills, kids, friends, all the demands of a busy life. We mean to be our best selves, but often we forget. David did it. He always did it. The note, the call, the book, the advice. When I mentioned this once he dug his hands deep into the pockets of his grey flannels, set his mouth at the corners, looked down and rumbled, "Well, but it's so easy." That's nonsense. It's not easy. But it is important, and why he has been remembered with enormous affection by ordinary readers all over this country, and why each of us who live some sort of public life would do well, with all due respect to Jesus, to ask ourselves about those small encounters: what would David do? ... Read her full tribute Dexter Filkins ...If I could use a sports metaphor--and I think David would have appreciated that--David was the pulling guard, as in a football game. The pulling guard who sweeps wide and clears the hole for the running back who runs through behind him. We reporters in Iraq were the running backs. David went first--a long time ago--and cleared the way. In Iraq, when the official version didn't match what we were seeing on the streets of Baghdad, all we had to do--and we did it a lot--was ask ourselves: what would Halberstam have done? And then the way was clear.... Read his full tribute A Timeline of the Korean War | | How It Began | | January 1950 | | Secretary of State Dean Acheson leaves Korea out of America's Far East Defense Perimeter. | | June 25, 1950 | | The North Korean Army crosses the 38th parallel with a force of about 135,000 troops. The Republic of Korea is taken completely by surprise by the invasion and their forces are soon in full retreat. | | July 7, 1950 | | General Douglas MacArthur is officially put in command of the forces set to defend the Republic of Korea. | | August 1950 | | Relentlessly focused attacks by the North Koreans drive the ill-prepared defense forces into the country's southeast corner. The Pusan Perimeter is established as the last best hope of maintaining a toehold on the peninsula. | | August-Sept. 1950 | | The North Koreans launch assault after assault against the Pusan Perimeter, with particularly brutal fighting taking place along the Naktong River. U.S. soldiers are in constant danger of being overrun. | | | | | September 15, 1950 | | MacArthur delivers his masterstroke with the amphibious landings at Inchon. The invasion blindsides the North Korean defenders and relieves pressure on the Pusan Perimeter. UN forces are able to drive north from Pusan and east from Inchon. By the end of September the North Korean forces are routed on all fronts, Seoul has been recaptured, and MacArthur receives permission to cross the 38th parallel. | | | The Debacle | | November 1950 | | U.S. soldiers march deep into North Korean territory, eventually reaching the Yalu River border with China. But the first warning of a conflict with the Chinese takes place at Unsan, where the Eighth Cavalry is mauled by a surprise engagement. By the end of November Chinese Communist forces mount a major offensive at Kunuri and the Chosin Reservoir. | | December 1950 | | Overwhelmed by hundreds of thousands of Chinese soldiers, UN forces are battered to positions below the 38th parallel. General Walker is killed in an accident, and General Ridgway takes over his command. General MacArthur lobbies relentlessly for attacks into China, an action that would draw China, and likely the USSR, into a full-scale war. Tensions between Truman and MacArthur escalate. | | January-February 1951 | | The Chinese reach the high-water mark of their assault. General Ridgway aggressively combats the Chinese in the fight for the central corridor, with major battles fought at Wonju, Twin Tunnels, and Chipyongni. | | April 11, 1951 | | Truman relieves General MacArthur of his duties. Raucous public outcry in support of the celebrated general further erodes Truman's popularity. | | | The End | | July 27, 1953 | | After years of bloody stalemate, a cease-fire is signed between North Korea and the UN. The border established is very close to the original line at the 38th parallel. It is estimated that the war cost 33,000 American, 415,000 South Korean, and up to 1.5 million Chinese and North Korean lives. In the arena of U.S. foreign policy, the lessons of Korea still largely remain unlearned. | | |  | | The drive to Seoul, September 16-28, 1950 | |
Product Description
David Halberstam's magisterial and thrilling The Best and the Brightest was the defining book for the Vietnam War. More than three decades later, Halberstam used his unrivalled research and formidable journalistic skills to shed light on another dark corner in our history: the Korean War. The Coldest Winter is a successor to The Best and the Brightest, even though in historical terms it precedes it.Halberstam considered The Coldest Winter the best book he ever wrote, the culmination of forty-five years of writing about America's postwar foreign policy.Up until now, the Korean War has been the black hole of modern American history.The Coldest Winter changes that. Halberstam gives us a masterful narrative of the political decisions and miscalculations on both sides. He charts the disastrous path that led to the massive entry of Chinese forces near the Yalu, and that caught Douglas MacArthur and his soldiers by surprise. He provides astonishingly vivid and nuanced portraits of all the major figures -- Eisenhower, Truman, Acheson, Kim, and Mao, and Generals MacArthur, Almond, and Ridgway. At the same time, Halberstam provides us with his trademark highly evocative narrative journalism, chronicling the crucial battles with reportage of the highest order.At the heart of the book are the individual stories of the soldiers on the front lines who were left to deal with the consequences of the dangerous misjudgments and competing agendas of powerful men. We meet them, follow them, and see some of the most dreadful battles in history through their eyes. As ever, Halberstam was concerned with the extraordinary courage and resolve of people asked to bear an extraordinary burden.The Coldest Winter is contemporary history in its most literary and luminescent form, and provides crucial perspective on the Vietnam War and the events of today. It was a book that Halberstam first decided to write more than thirty years ago and that took him nearly ten years to write. It stands as a lasting testament to one of the greatest journalists and historians of our time, and to the fighting men whose heroism it chronicles.Includes an Afterword by Russell BakerTributes to David HalberstamDavid Halberstam died at the age of 73 in a car accident in California on April 23, 2007, just after completing The Coldest Winter. Legendary for his work ethic, his kindness to young writers, and his unbending moral spine, Halberstam had friends and admirers throughout journalism, many of whom spoke at his memorial service and at readings across the country for the release of The Coldest Winter. We have included testimonials given at his memorial service by two writers who made their reputations at the same newspaper where he won a Pulitzer Prize for his Vietnam War reporting, The New York Times: Anna Quindlen ...David occupied a lot of space on the planet. Perhaps he felt the price he must pay for that big voice, that big reach, that big reputation, was that his generosity had to be just as large. Most of us, when we take to the road and meet admiring strangers, vow afterward to answer the note pressed into our hands or to pass along the speech we promised to the person whose daughter couldn't be there to hear it. But with the best will in the world we arrive home to deadlines, bills, kids, friends, all the demands of a busy life. We mean to be our best selves, but often we forget. David did it. He always did it. The note, the call, the book, the advice. When I mentioned this once he dug his hands deep intothe pockets of his grey flannels, set his mouth at the corners, looked down and rumbled, "Well, but it's so easy." That's nonsense. It's not easy. But it is important, and why he has been remembered with enormous affection by ordinary readers all over this country, and why each of us who live some sort of public life would do well, with all due respect to Jesus, to ask ourselves about those small encounters: what would David do? ... Read her full tributeDexter Filkins .
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| Customer Reviews: Read 123 more reviews...
 Not a history of the Korean War but a history of MacArthur and the War October 12, 2007
190 out of 223 found this review helpful
Having served two tours in the infantry in Korea during the War, and being a Korean War buff, I have a different view of the book than most of the reviewers. Unfortunately, the reviewers think that this book is about the Korean War. In part that is true but the real theme of the book is about how General Douglas MacArthur screwed it up.
The book is not a complete history of the Korean War as some reviewers have touted. It is anything but that. The book centers on the time period during which Gen. MacArthur was in command, both pre-war and until Pres. Truman relieved him of command. What little remains is more of an epilog very briefly describing the aftermath. That is why the book title is "The Coldest Winter" because it focuses on the disastrous defeat of the UN troops during the winter of 1950 as the result of MacArthur's bungling.
Because the book was billed as the most comprehensive history of the Korean War, I was lulled into reading it, only to be sorely disappointed. The first eight months of the War have been extensively covered in books and documentaries with the remaining 2 1/2 years given only cursory exposure, even though several major battles were fought during that period, so Halberstam doesn't expose any new ground. He just regurgitates material already written although he does it in an interesting fashion.
What I had hoped to read about was a thorough rendition of the history following MacArthur and the political decisions that colored the War and that was not there in the book for me. Not that I am not aware of them but a lot happened that is not generally known about and I hoped that Halberstam, with his reputation, would expose that material so that it become common knowledge to those studying or even interested in the War.
Some tout the book as telling the story of the historic escape of the First Marine Division from the Chosen Reservoir. It doesn't at all. The book tells how the Division Commander ignored MacArthur's orders in not racing to the Yalu and consequently the Marines were able make an orderly retreat, which the Army units were unable to do, but Halberstam provides almost no facts concerning the actual retreat, but when he does, the facts are not always correct. For example, the Chinese blew up the bridge between Koto-ri and Hungnam which crossed a narrow mountain gorge. Marine engineers then replaced it with a Bailey Bridge that was parachuted in. Halberstam says that it was the Air Force that dropped the bridge but I was on guard on the mountain above the gorge and I saw the bridge dropped from Marine Corps Flying Boxcars.
The book is not even a complete history of the first eight months of the Korean War. Most of it is devoted to certain battles which illustrated the incompetence either of MacArthur or the officers under him. It is only a partial picture of that period of the War but what there is, is done in remarkable detail.
Halberstam doesn't not highlight some of MacArthur's bad decisions as much as they should have been. While he brings out that it would have been a better strategy if the Marines had by-passed Seoul after landing at Inchon and cut off the retreat of the North Koreans, he doesn't give that mistake the emphasis that it warrants because it was a decision that really prolonged the War. Those familiar with the War are very conscious of that but lay readers may not.
Nor does he allude to the fact that MacArthur violated a basic tenant of fighting a War and that is after winning a battle, it is a cardinal principle that you stop and consolidate before resuming the attack. His failure to adhere to that principle was one reason the UN troops were so vulnerable when the Chinese struck.
One lament I have about the book is that it falls well short of providing its readers of what happened after Gen. Ridgeway took command. The book describes how the Chinese were suffering horrendous losses but Halberstam fails to follow through. The UN counter offensive resulted in more heavy losses to the Chinese as they were pushed back into North Korea, particularly on the eastern flank. The entire Chinese front was in such danger or collapsing that the Chinese sought a truce and Pres. Truman's biggest mistake was to agree to the truce. Had the UN rejected the truce offer, the Chinese would have been forced to retreat deep into N. Korea and that would have been a propitious time for the UN to agree to an armistice. Instead, the war went on for over two more years ending on July 28, 1953. It ended then only because a major Chinese offensive designed to push the Marines back across the Imjin River failed and the Chinese again had run out of steam.
Despite its shortcomings , as a book about the blundering of Gen. MacArthur, it is superb. Unfortunately, it was written 50 years too late. MacArthur was a desk general from the start of WWII and remained so during the Korean War. He really botched up the defense of the Philippines but because the Americans needed a hero, he was made a hero instead of a goat. He should have been relieved of his command. He actually played a subordinate role in the Pacific War which was mainly run by the Navy, but we all can be thankful for the atomic bomb, because if the Japanese had not surrendered, MacArthur would have been in charge of the invasion of Japan.
Not the complete history it purports to be September 25, 2007
72 out of 94 found this review helpful
This book is supposed to be a complete history of the Korean War but it falls far short of that goal. Having fought in Korea at the beginning and the end of the war, I was disappointed that the book devotes very little to what happened after MacArthur is fired in early 1951. The title " The Coldest Winter" fairly sums up the book because it is mainly devoted to explaining what occurred up to and through the route of the UN Forces during the winter of 1950. To that point, the book is fairly thorough and accurate but it only repeats what many other authors have already written. There are some inaccuracies though, such as the lament that while there are movies about the WWII, Vietnam, etc., there are no movies about the Korean War. In fact there are over a dozen movies such as The Bridge at Toko-Ri", "Pork Chop Hill", "Retreat Hell", "Steel Helmet", to name a few.
After the UN forces were driven back by the Chinese deep into South Korea, the UN forces were able to reorganize and launched a major counterattack in early 1951 which Halberstam writes about. But what the book fails to bring out is that in routing the UN forces, the Chinese had suffered heavy losses and did not have the reserves to replace those losses. The UN counter offensive resulted in more heavy losses to the Chinese as they were pushed back into North Korea, particularly on the eastern flank. The entire Chinese front was in such danger or collapsing that the Chinese sought a truce and Pres. Truman's biggest mistake was to agree to the truce. Had the UN rejected the truce offer, the Chinese would have been forced to retreat deep into N. Korea and that would have been a propitious time for the UN to agree to an armistice. Instead, the Chinese were able to get their second wind and the war went on for over two more years ending on July 28, 1953. It ended then only because a major Chinese offensive designed to push the Marines back across the Imjin River failed and the Chinese again had run out of steam.
Many important battles were fought up until the end which Halberstam fails to even acknowledge, particularly the last battle of Boulder City. But where he really falls short is that he misses all the maneuvering of Pres. Eisenhower to bring the war to an end, how the 25th Division was ordered not to counterattack and retake key outposts in May 1953, and later the First Marine Division was also barred from retaking other key outposts lost to the Chinese in July 1953. The loss of those outposts left the Marines naked on Boulder City and meant that the battle was fought in their front lines instead of 2,000 yards in front of them, and the result was very heavy casualties for the Marines. Except for some blunders by the Chinese, they could have penetrated the lines and driven the UN back across the Imjim River which would have left the Chinese a clear route right into the Korean capital at Seoul. Halberstam apparently was unaware of how significant the last battle was in War.
I don't agree with some of the review of this book by the Associated Press Reviewer. He laments that the book fails to cover the deaths of many Korean civilians. It is true that many Koreans died but he exaggerates the number of Koreans who died at the hands of Americans. The few that were killed by Americans were killed in the first days of the war mainly because North Korean soldiers intermingled with civilians. Some were killed as the result of bombing and shelling of enemy positions. In my own experience three civilians were killed in a house in North Korea in which the North Koreans were using as a machine gun nest. But the civilian deaths were irrelevant as far as history goes because those deaths did not influence the outcome of the war or any battles. Halberstam rightfully excluded mention of them.
 David Halberstam's final opus, a trimph of men September 25, 2007
63 out of 71 found this review helpful
"The Coldest Winter," David Halberstam's final journalistic tribute to heroes, is a fitting tribute to the men of the oft forgotten war.
Halberstam's lengthy career in journalism and as an author shows in his brilliant writing style that keeps you engrossed in every word. It is not surprising that someone who has written so much about Vietnam, would have a huge resource to draw upon in a work about the Korean War.
The Coldest Winter is a story that needed telling, much the way Herodotus told of the men of Thermopylae or, more recently how Stephen Ambrose told of the men of Easy Company in "Band of Brothers."
Halberstam understood well how most Americans ignore the events and outcome of the Korean Conflict; often, that part of history seems better left untold. The Coldest Winter tells this story and it's back stories and even it's substantial post-script. We mustn't forget that South Korea's success today owes a debt to the American and U.N. forces who fought there over half a century ago.
What Halberstam also does in this book is point out the miserable failings of Generals like MacArthur, long-time sacred cows of the World Wars, whose hubris in later life jeopardized the legacy of any truly heroic deeds of their early careers. General Ned Almond is also lambasted for his stubbornness and poor leadership style, which Halberstam shows led to unnecessary losses of American and U.N. forces.
While "Coldest Winter" is by no means concise as far as a historiography goes, Halberstam has revealed the machinations that led to the war and the egos that sustained it. This is not a blow-by-blow, battlefield-to-battlefield account of the Korean War, much of the latter part of the war is overlooked. But, it covers the broader picture and the political implications and ramifications of American civilian policy versus military instinct in the early 1950s, however poor it may have served us.
The Coldest Winter is a hefty book, at over 650 pages, broken into eleven sections with over 50 chapters, but it reads as fast as it reads brilliant.
This is the first Halberstam book I have read, I regret that it comes only after his passing. There were certainly more great works to come had he not met his untimely death.
REVIEW EVERY BOOK YOU READ, OTHER READERS, PUBLISHERS AND AUTHORS DESERVE YOUR OPINIONS TOO.
A sturdy and interesting book. September 25, 2007
43 out of 50 found this review helpful
The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War by David Halberstam will stand the test to time just as all of his other works have. It is sad that Mr. Halberstam died last April in an automobile accident while working on his next book. This fact makes reading his last book doubly important, and a little difficult. This is the last trip to the water fountain.
The Coldest Winter is well written. While lengthy, there is no fat. Cut a few facts here or there and you've changed the value of the work and not for the better. With books like this I sometimes jump around from chapter to chapter taking the topics in an order that is important to me. I wasn't able to do that with the Coldest Winter.
There are a few surprises in the book. I thought that MacArthur was treated pretty fairly by Halberstam. MacArthur is not the perfect leader that he has been portrayed as in much of the media. In fact, at this stage of his career he is beginning to exhibit signs of feebleness brought on by the shaking hands and loss of hearing. That MacArthur underestimated the Communist Koreans is a fact of history but not often discussed.
I was also taken by the amount of confusion in the Truman administration during the first few days after the North crossed the border. Very eye opening.
I also highly valued the discussions of both Korean leaders, Syngman Rhee in the south and Kim Il Sung in the north. Halberstams treatment of these two leaders along with his wonderfully concise but accurate history of both the Koreas not only adds to the value of this book, but puts into perspective much of the recent difficulty with North Korea and their obsession with nuclear weapons.
Halberstam has always written masterfully constructed books. The reader can tell that Halberstam loved research because he did it so well and it shows in his books.
The Coldest Winter, in my opinion, is a must read for those that love current events but love history as well.
The Coldest Winter will be a terrific addition to your personal library.
A war orphaned by historians May 1, 2008
35 out of 44 found this review helpful
In terms of books written about it, the Korean War was the black hole of American historiography, compared to the large output on WW2 and Vietnam; a nasty 'little' forgotten war. With Halberstam's last book before he died in a car accident, the gap is a little smaller.
Most wars can be seen as a series of mistakes. The Korean War offers itself perfectly for that approach. We know who 'started' it, that was clearly North Korea's invasion of the South in June 50.
But who 'caused' it? If monocausal explanations are worth anything, then Dean Acheson surely is the prime candidate with his monumental gaffe of forgetting to include Korea in a speech defining America's interest zone in Asia. That was clearly the signal to the uneasy triad of Kim, Mao and Stalin, that an adventure might work. Which was mistake number two. They had not counted on incompetence in the US government.
Next: the breathtaking inefficiency of MacArthur's intelligence, his view of the world defined as truth, which ignored on a level of criminal negligence the reports that something was building up North of the demarcation line. (Comparable to intelligence failures before 9/11 and the lies before the Iraq invasion? This is what happens when intelligence is a tool for a pre-defined view!)
Kim's stupidity in ignoring the warnings about the Inchon landing. Lucky for the good guys.
The focus on conquering Seoul rather than blocking the retreat to the North for the invaders. Costly! Again PR value over strategy!
The silly amphibious landing in Wonsan, when the Marines could have gotten there easily and faster on land from Pusan. (And Bob Hope had to perform to a nearly empty audience, as the Marines were stuck in their ships when the harbour was mined.)
Not wanting to repeat the whole book here (which is 650 pages of bad weather and anti-MacArthurism, not to forget the brillant brief bio sketches of the main protagonists, that we are used to expect from Halberstam), let's jump into the phase when the war seemed to be won: next mistake, underestimating the enemy, caused by the same basic flaw: intelligence to prove what we know already.
The failure to anticipate the Chinese invasion was a massive misjudgement, equally hard to understand as the man's previous failure to expect the Japanese invasion of the Philippines. Of course in between he had made the impossible become true and carried out the Incheon landing, which erased the memory of previous errors.
That in turn was the basis for the US government's next big error: not to remove MacArthur from his command in time. The man seemed untouchable. A very costly overestimation of his value. Of course how would a weak accidental president be expected to trust his own judgement more than that of a war hero?
The pity is that mistakes are never learnt from. That is of course mainly because we can usually not agree on the what and the who in first place.
Or sometimes, when they are learnt from, then in the sense of the generals who fight the previous wars: unaware of the law of life which says that once you know the answers, the questions get changed.
Skimming through the book later, it occurs to me that I ought to have mentioned the special story of the 'loss' of China, which was politically a very relevant background noise of the Korea War. Of course the tragedy of China's civil war was that there was no competent leadership on the nationalist side, and that furthermore the anti Truman forces in the US had decided to be so totally taken in by that fraud CKS and his Missimo. While Mao had his starry eyed Edgar Snow for propaganda, CKS commanded the loyalty of Henry Luce and his press empire. Luce turned out to be a mighty force for befuddlement of American brains. In comparison, Snow was not much more than a court jester.
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