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| Scipio Africanus: Rome's Greatest General | 
 enlarge | Author: Richard A. Gabriel
Publisher: Potomac Books Inc.
Category: Book
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Avg. Customer Rating:  8 reviews
Sales Rank: 181345
Media: Hardcover
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 326
Shipping Weight (lbs): 1.4
Dimensions (in): 9 x 6.2 x 1.2
ISBN: 1597972053
Dewey Decimal Number: 937.04092
EAN: 9781597972055
ASIN: 1597972053
Publication Date: June 30, 2008
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Product Description
The world often misunderstands its greatest men while neglecting others entirely. Scipio Africanus, surely the greatest general that Rome produced, suffered both these fates. Today scholars celebrate the importance of Hannibal, even though Scipio defeated the legendary general in the Second Punic War and was the central military figure of his time. In this scholarly and heretofore unmatched military biography of the distinguished Roman soldier, Richard A. Gabriel establishes Scipio’s rightful place in military history as the greater of the two generals.
Before Scipio, few Romans would have dreamed of empire, and Scipio himself would have regarded such an ambition as a danger to his beloved republic. And yet, paradoxically, Scipio’s victories in Spain and Africa enabled Rome to consolidate its hold over Italy and become the dominant power in the western Mediterranean, virtually ensuring a later confrontation with the Greco-Macedonian kingdoms to the east as well as the empire’s expansion into North Africa and the Levant. The Roman imperium was being born, and it was Scipio who had sired it.
Gabriel draws upon ancient texts, including those from Livy, Polybius, Diodorus, Silius Italicus, and others, as primary sources and examines all additional material available to the modern scholar in French, German, English, and Italian. His book offers a complete bibliography of all extant sources regarding Scipio’s life. The result is a rich, detailed, and contextual treatment of the life and career of Scipio Africanus, one of Rome’s greatest generals, if not the greatest of them all.
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| Customer Reviews: Read 3 more reviews...
 For the glory of Scipio? August 2, 2008
14 out of 19 found this review helpful
Richard Gabriel is a distinguished military historian who writes well and in this book provides a wealth of information and speculation concerning Scipio. Most noteworthy are the logistical analyses, which in general are well researched and highly informative. There are some problems with this book, though, despite its overall high quality. The author tells us that a lot of the best research on the Second Punic War is in German, which fortunately he is able to read. Wunderbar, I told myself. But examining the bibliography at the end of the book I was surprised to discover several German titles rendered ungrammatically, a children's book by Donauer included as if it were a scholarly work, and the works of the top scholars of the Punic Wars publishing in German over the past few decades (Jakob Seibert, Pedro Barcelo, Karl Christ usw.) blatantly missing.
Gabriel's attempts to present Scipio as a "brilliant" operational commander and "brilliant" strategist greater than Hannibal fail to convince (as do equally misguided attempts by others to portray Wellington as greater than Napoleon--Napoleon, by the way, regarded Hannibal as the greatest general of all, see the Memorial de Sainte-Helene by the Comte Emmanuel de las Cases). As the author suggests, the brilliance of a general depends on the quality of his defeated opponents, but the only great opponent Scipio ever defeated was Hannibal at Zama, a victory scored by luck and the fortunate arrival of Massinissa's cavalry at the battlefield in the nick of time (even Gabriel concedes that Hannibal had the better battle plan). To boost Scipio's credentials Gabriel claims repeatedly that the incompetent Carthaginian generals Scipio defeated in Spain were actually competent, especially the bungling Hasdrubal Gisco, surely the sorriest excuse for a commander in the Punic Wars. He credits Scipio with great military innovations, but fails to mention that he copied these from the organization of Hannibal's army, which Scipio experienced at the Roman defeats at the Ticinus, Trebbia, and Cannae. Scipio's victory at Ilipa owes more to Hannibal as a model that to any ingenuity on Scipio's part. The author even tries to credit Scipio with deriving the gladius hispaniensis from the Spanish falcata, although anyone who has held a falcata and a gladius in hand can tell they are totally different weapons. The gladius was based on a Spanish sword, but it is unlikely it was the falcata. Scipio is presented as an honorable man, and unfortunately Gabriel whitewashes his atrocities in ordering the butchery of the civilians in three cities (excusing the terrorism because "it served his strategic ends"), not to mention the scourging and beheading of his own officers after they rebelled because of lack of pay, even though he had promised them clemency if they surrendered. (Hannibal, by the way, although he fought in enemy territory for 15 years without ever being defeated, during which time he often could not pay his mercenaries, never suffered mutiny, which perhaps shows which commander was better able to inspire loyalty in his forces). Gabriel attributes Scipio's refusal to engage Hannibal in Italy to some grand strategic plan concerning Rome's future security, which supposedly demanded he be defeated in Africa, when there is a much simpler explanation, namely that Scipio was afraid he would be defeated if he faced Hannibal in Italy and needed to get him to return to Africa minus his cavalry in order to have a chance of victory. Scipio was clearly an opportunist concerned with his personal glory and refused peace overtures (even betraying the Carthaginians when he pretended to consider their very reasonable proposals, and then burning their camps in a treacherous night attack). He was willing to sacrifice countless lives (of his own soldiers and those of the enemy) in order to win a triumph for narcissistic glory. Hannibal was definitely the greater commander and the better man, a patriot who sacrificed everything for his country. The notion of his being motivated by hatred of Rome is a myth created by Roman propaganda, bent upon demonizing Hannibal and the Carthaginians. This is evident in the writings of Livy and particularly Silius Italicus, a poet and not a historian, whose versified fictions Gabriel accepts as reliable historical sources. Even among Roman generals, Marius, Sulla, Pompey, and above all Ceasar far outshine Scipio. Gabriel's claim that Caesar displayed no originality or innovation in the battlefield is belied by that brilliant defense in the siege of Alesia, to mention just one example. Gabriel's book, although in many ways a significant contribution to the field, suffers of bias in his efforts to achieve "majorem Scipionic gloriam." And as to the claim that Rome's victory over Carthage was good for posterity, the reader is urged to peruse Neil Faulkner's excellent book "Rome: Empire of the Eagles" to evaluate the destructive and predatory imperialism of Rome which can be contrasted with the tolerance of Carthaginian culture, destroyed in a frenzy of genocide and ethnic cleansing by the Romans in 146 BCE.
 Not so great Scipio September 21, 2008
8 out of 8 found this review helpful
Reading the differing views of reviewers Asaro and Augustin makes one thing clear: while the latter has obviously read the book, the former, despite being an ardent fan of Scipio, has not. Otherwise he would have noticed that Gabriel himself discounts the myth of the 80 elephants Roman propaganda gives to Hannibal at Zama, and also that Gabriel realizes that it was Hannibal who was responsible for luring the cavalry of Massinissa and Laelius from the battlefield. It was sheer luck that they returned before Hannibal's veterans cut down the Roman line--probably it was a matter of minutes that saved Scipio from defeat. At Zama the armies were not evenly matched. Hannibal was unable to bring back his cavalry from Italy, and with the exception of his last line of veterans, he had only inferior troops. Massinissa's betrayal gave Scipio a large cavalry advantage. It is clear that without Massinissa Scipio's chances of defeating Hannibal were non-existent. Scipio did not fight any great armies or generals prior to Zama. The Carthaginian commanders in Spain were largely incompetent, with the possible exception of Hannibal's brother Hasdrubal, and in his case Scipio failed to prevent him from escaping with his army largely intact to cross the Alps to attempt to join his brother in Italy, so that Baecula was untimately a fiasco rather than a great victory. To compare Scipio's victories against incompetents such as Hasdrubal Gisco with Caesar's victories over the likes of Vercingetorix or Pompey (a great Roman general himself, leading a first class professional army) is preposterous. And Scipio's "victory" against Syphax and Hasdrubal Gisco by the treacherous burning of their camps in the middle of the night while pretending to negotiate a peace treaty was dishonorable to say the least (similar to the Japanese "victory" at Pearl Harbour). Mr. Asaro further shows his ignorance by stating that the cavalry battle of the Ticinus was a standoff rather than a victory for Hannibal, which is total nonsense. Hannibal defeated the Romans at the Ticinus river, at the Trebia, at Lake Trasimeno, at Cannae, at Herdonea (twice), remained undefeated on Italian soil for over 15 years, and would have vanquished Scipio in the last battle ,had it not been for the lucky (for the Romans) return of Massinissa. It was a tragedy for the world that lack of resources did not allow him to win the war in Italy, for after Zama the militaristic Roman Republic became the predatory Roman Empire. To understand the implications, read Faulkner's Rome: Empire of the Eagles. And for a better appreciation of what really happened at Zama, see the article by Mosig & Belhassen in The International Journal of the Humanities, 5:9, 2007, pp. 175-186.
 Hail Scipio! August 1, 2008
5 out of 11 found this review helpful
This author has written a highly-readable and thoroughly researched biography of history's forgotten genius. Such work is long overdue. For those who enjoy learning about men who were clearly ahead of their time, read this book. Genius and greatness transcend time, and Scipio's accomplishments are evidence of that. This is a must read for anyone with an interest in military history or leadership.
 A strange pottage August 17, 2008
5 out of 8 found this review helpful
Sharing Mr Gabriel's observation that no one has written a biography of Scipio which truly evaluates the man's place in Roman military history, and being myself something of a fan of the great Africanus, I was very much looking forward to reading this one, but could only struggle about halfway through before giving up in frustration and annoyance. The sources of both are many. While conceding that Gabriel's descriptions and speculations about Scipio's campaigns and battles are interesting--even when he overlooks his own earlier solutions to questions which he later poses--I found his projection of the modern political and military mindset onto Carthage and Rome most annoying. Both states emerge in his narrative as modern entities of some sort, in which a thought-out policy is established by the civilian government and entrusted to the military for execution. Such was certainly not the case with either city, and certainly not the case with the Barcids' activity in Spain, which was viewed with enormous suspicion by their political rivals in Carthage. Equally annoying is the author's habit of contradicting himself within a matter of lines, e.g., the Spanish city of Saguntum is identified as an independent city and half a paragraph later is said to revolt against Carthage; his obvious unfamiliarity with the Latin language and its terminology, e.g., his translation of "mare clausum" as the enclosing (instead of enclosed) sea and identification of the term "legion" as deriving from Romulus' primitive army instead of the word for "to pick" or "select"; and his tendency to the grandiose, e.g., describing the situation of Rome's allies as obliged to help her "for decades" against Hannibal, thirteen years after his arrival in Italy. Gabriel's description of the Roman army is a true pottage of information taken from works written over the past century and a half (I was surprised that he did not cite H. P. Judson's long-outdated "Caesar's Army") which describe the Republican army at different eras and stages of development, but are applied to that of Scipio's time as found convenient to whatever thesis the author wishes to argue. Likewise, he boasts of his familiarity with the German and Italian literature on Scipio and the second Punic war in his introduction, but fails to include in his bibliography two recent and noteworthy English works, viz., Adrian Goldsworthy's "The Punic Wars" and "Cannae". And how can one not mention the small things, such as the use of "legionnaires" for "legionaries" and the spelling errors ("make due" for "make do") liberally scattered about the text? While I agree with Mr Gabriel's statement that an up-to-date biography of Scipio is needed, I fear that his does not qualify.
Perspectives on this book September 1, 2008
4 out of 12 found this review helpful
I am writing this review to correct what are very serious errors by the first review that appears here, and what also appear to me to be a bewildering perspective given in that review, in the hope that those who are not familiar with the history of the second Punic War and its aftermath may be more encouraged to read the book and the few that have proceeded it - including the history of Polybius. In the first place, the first review completely fails to note that Scipio Africanus faced a far more professional set of generals than the likes of Marius, Sulla, or even Julius Caesar. He did this, despite the lack of full support of Rome. To compare Scipio to them is absurd as their circumstances and the significance of what Scipio faced and they did are so far apart as to render comparison meaningless. The reviewer fails to note Scipio's defeat of 4 Catharginian armies in Spain, 2 more in Africa, before meeting Hannibal at Zama; all armies were led by well seasoned and highly professional commanders. At Zama Hannibal had advantage of his veteran troops, 80 war elephants, and a well manned cavalry. The two sides were rather evenly matched. Hannibal's veterans troops were at the rear - so why do you think Scipio had Laelius and Massinisa first drive the Hannibal's cavalry off the field and then encircle Hannibal's veterans? Luck? Now comes a typical Hannibal apology - "It wasn't Scipio that beat Hannibal, it was the Roman cavalry" - Oh lord! Let me digress a bit to demonstrate the nonsense of this type of "reasoning". Try saying it wasn't Montgomery and later Patten that drove Rommel all over North Africa, it was the British and then the American armored divisions. The comment is absurd of course, but that is my point! Scipio fully realized the criticality of a well disciplined cavalry and very effectively built one, first around Laelius, and then around Laelius and Massinisa. He also built an effective naval force as he needed it. He revolutionized Roman tactics, which of course the likes of Marius, Sulla, and "what's his name" inherited, but never really did themselves. As for a grand strategy, that began with Scipio's father and uncle who decided to press on to Spain rather then turn back to face Hannibal - the battle of the Tinicus was more of a standoff then a victory for Hannibal! It appears that the reviewer would benefit from a bit of background reading and not rely on Hollywood movies for his "facts" and perspective.
To call Scipio Rome's greatest general is quite appropriate - after all, within 53 years after Zama Rome went from being an Italian city state to ruling most of of the world it knew - did the others accomplish that? Hannibal and his country lost it all. But, as Hart had told us, folks like the loser, not the winner.
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