Retribution: The Battle for Japan, 1944-45

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Hailed in Britain as “Spectacular . . . Searingly powerful” (Andrew Roberts, The Sunday Telegraph), a riveting, impeccably informed chronicle of the final year of the Pacific war. In his critically acclaimed Armageddon, Hastings detailed the last twelve months of the struggle for Germany. Here, in what can be considered a companion volume, he covers the horrific story of the war against Japan.

By the summer of 1944 it was clear that Japan’s defeat was inevitable, but how the drive to victory would be achieved remained to be seen. The ensuing drama—that ended in Japan’s utter devastation—was acted out across the vast stage of Asia, with massive clashes of naval and air forces, fighting through jungles, and barbarities by an apparently incomprehensible foe. In recounting the saga of this time and place, Max Hastings gives us incisive portraits of the theater’s key figures—MacArthur, Nimitz, Mountbatten, Chiang Kai-shek, Mao, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin. But he is equally adept in his portrayals of the ordinary soldiers and sailors—American, British, Russian, Chinese, and Japanese—caught in some of the war’s bloodiest campaigns.

With unprecedented insight, Hastings discusses Japan’s war against China, now all but forgotten in the West, MacArthur’s follies in the Philippines, the Marines at Iwo Jima and Okinawa, and the Soviet blitzkrieg in Manchuria. He analyzes the decision-making process that led to the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki—which, he convincingly argues, ultimately saved lives. Finally, he delves into the Japanese wartime mind-set, which caused an otherwise civilized society to carry out atrocities that haunt the nation to this day.

Retribution is a brilliant telling of an epic conflict from a master military historian at the height of his powers.

Customer Reviews: Read 47 more reviews...

5 out of 5 stars

"I may be crazy, but it looks like the Japanese have quit the war..." * March 18, 2008
139 out of 144 found this review helpful

With age comes a bit of weariness, and I confess that huge books with small print have begun to intimidate me just a bit. But some of them are so well-written and so interesting that page-anxiety drops away after the first couple of chapters. So it was for me with Max Hastings' Retribution.

Retribution, which chronicles the final year of World War II's Pacific Theatre, is a companion to Hasting's Armageddon, a history of the European Theatre's final year. The new volume begins with General MacArthur's plans to retake the Philippines and ends with a quick summary of the war's effects on Japanese society and culture. In between, Hastings examines the infiltration of total warfare into everyday Japanese life; the battle for control of the sea corridors, the Burma campaign and the Aussies who fought it (which I found particularly fascinating, knowing virtually nothing about it); the air campaign over Japan, masterminded by Curtis LeMay (also an especially intriguing chapter, particularly for those who presume that the only big bomb damage in Japan were the nuclear blasts over Hiroshima and Nagasaki); the unspeakably horrific Japanese treatment of China and Manchuria; the ferocious battles on Iwo Jima (to which Hastings devotes an entire chapter); and the behind-the-scenes negotiations that led up to Japan's final surrender.

Hastings punctuates his history of the Pacific Theatre's final year with dozens of stories about individual people whose lives were affected--GIs, sailors, Japanese infantrymen and pilots, Chinese "comfort girls," generals, admirals, statesmen--and this is part of what makes his book such a fascinating read. Moreover, Hastings doesn't pull any punches in his estimation of the war's leaders. MacArthur, for example, comes off as one of the most overrated military leaders ever produced by the U.S. Hirohito also comes across badly. Despite the post-war efforts to paint him as a pacifist overwhelmed by sabre-rattling generals, Hastings argues that the Emperor advocated war right up to the end.

Three things in particular struck me in reading Hastings. The first was that bushido, the ancient code of honor embraced by the Japanese military, made life hell for ordinary foot soldiers, who could be savagely beaten by superiors for little or no reason. Apparently such abuse was seen as a way of toughening up the fighting spirit. Bushido also encouraged disdain for military technology on the part of Japanese officers. "Why do we need radar?" one of them asked. "Do we not have eyes that see perfectly well?" (p. 47) This attitude led to a constant technological lag throughout the entire war.

The second was that the Kamikaze strategy adopted by the Japanese toward the end of the war not only failed in its aim of striking fear and panic into the hearts of Allied sailors, but actually had the opposite effect. Sailors were so enraged by what they perceived as cowardly attacks that their ferocity against the Japanese intensified. As one seaman wrote, "seeing dead Japanese in the water was like making love to a beautiful girl" (p. 173). This is a point worth considering, given the current war on terrorism.

Finally, I was amazed to discover that Japanese civilians were so physically and psychologically exhausted by the war that the US occupation forces actually had to protect Japanese soldiers from their wrath when the war ended (pp. 547-48). Even before the end came, some Japanese were privately voicing reservations about the culture of bushido (p. 264). But with defeat came a desire to leave behind the old culture--to such an extent that only Japan, out of all the war's Axis powers, has refused to acknowledge any war guilt or offer reparations (p. 549).

Hastings' book is well worth reading, either straight-through or selectively. One better appreciates just how daunting a task the island-by-island Allied strategy was, as well as how hopeless (at least when viewed in hindsight) Japan's imperialistic aims were.
________
* A message to Admiral Nimitz from Admiral Richmond Turner, commander of amphibious forces during the invasion of Okinawa. Nimitz's skeptical reply: "Delete all after 'crazy'" (p. 375).

5 out of 5 stars

A Pacific War Classic March 19, 2008
66 out of 67 found this review helpful

I became aware of this book on the brink of its UK pubication. The UK title is: Nemesis: The Battle for Japan 1944-1945. I ended up getting the UK edition. I just didn't want to wait for the US edition, so I got it (and I live in Wyoming!). I'm glad I did. Hastings brings forth all his formidable powers, both in research, analysis and in his writing abilities.
Hastings praises the US Navy (especially the Submarine Service), condemns MacArthur (or more correctly, his oversized ego), Bill Slim is seen as one of the war's great captains (though Hastings believes Burma did little to contribute to the defeat of Japan), praises the courage of the Japanese, but damns their cruelty and their leadership's poor decisions.

Retribution is the companion volume to Armageddon. As is typical of Hastings, readers probably won't agree with 100% of his judgements and opinions. But the way he organizes his facts and presents his narrative, he presents a formidable case that's hard to deny.

What sets this book apart from the clear majority of Pacific war books, is that Hastings also has chapters on the war's neglected theaters, China and we see the war as both the Communists and Kuomintang, the Australians and of course, the Soviets. It's not just about the Americans, Japanese and to a lesser extent, the British. American readers may not agree with everything Mr. Hastings writes, but part of what makes him so interesting is that he's brilliantly provocative.

1 out of 5 stars

Riddled with errors June 15, 2008
24 out of 40 found this review helpful

Hastings is one of the best authors of our time, and I have thoroughly enjoyed his previous works. So I eagerly awaited this selection by the History Book Club, in part to see what was advertised as his defense of the use of firebombing and the atomic bombs, a rarity in academe these days, but a position with which I agree. When it did, as I typically do, I did not start at the beginning, but went to what should have been my favorite part of the book, the Battle of Leyte Gulf, to see what novel ideas and theories he has.

And Hastings does have some novel ideas and theories. See if you notice a pattern:

Page 132: "[In October 1944] The Imperial Navy still disposed a force which, a few years past, had awed the world. Of ten battleships in commission at the start of the war, nine remained."

At the start of the war, the Japanese had ten battleships. In October 1944, they had nine. That much is true. The problem is not all of those nine were in commission at the start of the war. Of those ten that were, three were sunk: Hiei and Kirishima were sunk during the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, and the Mutsu sunk after she exploded under mysterious circumstances at Hashirajima anchorage. So seven of that original ten were still in service. Two more were completed after the start of the war: Yamato and Musashi.

Starting on page 132: Hastings calls the Japanese operational plan at Leyte Gulf "Shogo" -- "Operation Victory." I have seen it referred to as "Sho Go," "Sho-Go," "Sho-I-Go" or Sho-Ichi-Go" ("ichi" meaning "one" -- the plan for Leyte Gulf was "Sho 1"). I have never seen it called "Shogo" before.

Page 135: The submarine attack on Kurita's Center Force off Palawan by US submariens Darter and Dace. Hastings says, "This first American success was made possible by a tactical carelessness amounting to recklessness [...]" without giving elaboration. This amounts to a drive-by. In truth, the Darter ended up running aground on Bombay Shoal and had to be destroyed after the crew was taken off by the Dace.

Page 138: Hastings claims that light cruiser Noshiro was sunk by US carrier aircraft during Kurita's transit through the Sibuyan Sea on October 24. During this enounter, the Musashi was sunk and the heavy cruiser Myoko so badly damaged she had to retire.

Page 159: Hastings claims that the light cruiser Noshiro was sunk again on October 26 as Kurita retreated through the Sibuyan Sea. In truth, this was when the Noshiro was actually sunk. She was undamaged during the attacks on October 24.

Page 144: Hastings touches on the entire "Fuso-Yamashiro thing" -- the controversey over which battleship was sunk where in the Battle of Surigao Strait. Hastings claims that Jesse Coward's eastern destroyers launched torpedoes and at 3:08 am "heard a single explosion aboard a Japanese ship, probably Yamashiro." He later states that a torpedo from the Monssen of Coward's western destroyers left the Yamashiro "crippled," and continues:

The next American destroyer attack, by Squadron 24, probably achieved two hits. It is still disputed whether battleship gunfire or torpedoes were responsible, but what is certain is that the battleship Fuso, laid down in 1912, caught fire and broke in two after a huge explosion. Bewilderment persists about how readily such a hugh ship succumbed, but senility plaintly rendered it vulnerable.

The Fuso-Yamashiro controversy involves whether or not the Fuso took a torpedo hit at about 3:09 am (Hastings says 3:08) from the destroyer Melvin of Coward's destroyer group. No one that I am aware of has alleged that Yamashiro took that torpedo hit at that time. Moreover, the account from the Melvin alleged "two large and separate explosions seen." It was Japanese heavy seaplane cruiser Mogami that saw only one explosion.

There is indeed a dispute as to whether Fuso was sunk by torpedoes or gunfire, as Hastings claims, but the dispute concerns whether she took that torpedo and dropped out to explode and break in two, or if it was Yamashiro that dropped out to explode and break in two while Fuso continued onward to face the US battleline where she would receive concentrated gunfire from US battleships and cruisers.

By Hastings' description, Fuso has taken no gunfire, and the tropedo hit that she is believed to have received Hastings instead says was received by the Yamashiro. By Hastings' timeline, Fuso has taken no definite damage. Hastiongs has garbled the controversy and, in the process, garblesd the account of the Battle of Surigao Strait.

Pages 146 and 147: Hastings' timeline of Shima's torpedo atatck is also all wrong. Hastings has Shima launching a torpedo attack on radar contacts that turned out to be the Hibuson Islands (the humor of war), then seeing the two burning halves of the Fuso, mistaking them for separate ships. At that point he turned his force around, during which time his flagship Nachi collided with the Mogami.

What actually happened is that Shima saw the Fuso, mistaking the two halves to be burning ships, and the burning Mogami. Passing the Fuso, he saw the radar contacts and decided to launch a torpedo attack on them while hiding behind the glare of the Mogami. he mistook Mogami to be stationary when she was moving southward, and the Nachi then "skidded" into the Mogami. Aftwer receiving this damage, as well as the earlier torpedoing of the light cruiser Abukuma, and with no definite intelligence aside from the apparent annihilation of Nishimura's force, Shima withdrew.

Page 156: Hastings continually gets the names of two of Taffy 3's escort carriers wrong. He calls the Kitkun Bay the "Kitgun Bay" and the Kalinin Bay the "Kallin Bay."

Page 157: Hastings states the Japanese heavy seaplane cruiser Chikuma was sunk by bombs and aerial torpedoes. He goes on to describe the sinking by Japanese gunfire of the US escort carrier Gambier Bay. Except the Gambier Bay was sunk by the Chikuma; several pictures from the battle off Samar show the Gambier Bay under fire with the Chikuma vuisible in the distance. Hastings messed up the timeline again.

These are just the mistakes and omissions I found in one chapter. Basic things like events, timelines and ship names. Is this the result of poor editing or poor research?

What other factual errors are hidden in this book? Can I trust Hastings general writing, themes and opinions (usally very, very good) when there is so much erroneous with this thin slice?

3 out of 5 stars

Hastings Stumbles April 2, 2008
19 out of 43 found this review helpful

Let me preface my remarks by saying that I am a big Max Hastings fan. I find his writing superb, his narrative riveting and his facts enlightening. However, Retribution misses the mark.

The War in the Pacific is not as linear as the European theatre. No straight line maps work to enlighten the reader of positions and strategy. The messiness of the Pacific campaigns makes writing about it difficult. However, a master like Hastings should be able to overcome these obstacles. He fails to do so here.

So many recently released documents have made for several great recent histories of the Pacific war. Revisionist histories placing more critical light on the failures of Halsey and the role of Hirohito make for important reading. Nothing in Retribution rises to that level. After so many pages of text I found nothing new in Retribution to justify its writing or reading. I expected so much and got so little.

Sure a work by Hastings is important in and of itself to justify purchasing Retribution. However, if you are looking for new insights, prepare to be disappointed.

4 out of 5 stars

Excellent Last Year Against Japan, Bogs Down On Surrender vs Atomic Bomb Issue August 29, 2008
17 out of 18 found this review helpful

The British author Max Hastings normally a creditable job in covering his campaign de june, but this time as with "Armageddon" he attempts to cover larger campaigns and issues of WWII and doesn't succeed. The British slant is present as usual, this time playing up the British campaigns in the CBI theater as important to Japan's defeat. Well, hardly. The fastest the British moved was in steaming to Hong Kong to re-occupy their former colony at war's end before the Americans got there, an item Hastings doesn't mention. Siam was lost to them due the OSS support of the "Black Thais", and that couldn't be allowed to happen again.

The strong points have been covered well in other reviews, but allow me to add a few facts into the debate over the necessity of dropping the atomic bombs. Yes, the Japanese Foreign Office had made an offer (in response to a query) to surrender through the Soviet Union in early July but it was clearly unacceptable to the US. These cables and their decoding through Magic were discussed at length (see Richard B. Frank, "Downfall"), and although the clear Japanese text is sometimes seized upon to prove the revisionists' case that Japan would have surrendered without the atomic bombs being dropped or suffering an invasion, the analysis made at the time clearly held such a possibility to be highly improbable. Nonetheless, we see it again and again by those, often from the now-defunct British Empire, who wish to vilify the US. You can see some of this in the other reviews, including the one done by the Washington Post writer. As Hastings said, "The myth that the Japanese were ready to surrender anyway (without the atomic bombs being dropped) has been so comprehensively discredited by modern research that it is astonishing some writers continue to give it credence."

On the other hand, Hastings said, "It is now widely acknowledged that Olympic (the invasion of Japan) would almost certainly have been unnecessary." Maybe, but incorrectly. Yes, Japan was facing declining food availability, but had been for some time. A greater question was whether the American public would be willing to accept the casualties an invasion would would bring. If not, then a negotiated peace would be necessary, and in this respect is it noteworthy that post-war Japan has successfully fought off almost all attempts to assign war guilt to Japan or even to accept responsibility for their aggression and murderous occupation policies. US citizens blithely purchase Mitsubishi products even though the company employed slave labor during the war. Mitsubishi even sought to question whether Japan had invaded China, but somehow its automobiles are purchased by Americans who are willing to give Japan a pass on its crimes. Perhaps Mitsubishi should use the slogan, "From the Company that gave you the Japanese Zero with slave labor."

It is also interesting to note that none of the capitulation initiatives until after the dropping of the Nagasaki bomb originated in Japan. The Japanese Foreign office only responded to initiatives from other countries during June and July. In addition, the Potsdam Declaration issued on July 26th, effectively spelled out the Allied terms of surrender that were unacceptable to the Japanese military. Their only hope was to make American casualties so unacceptable to the American public that they could obtain better terms. The validity of such a strategy would later be proven by the Chinese in Korea and the North Vietnamese in Vietnam.

The reader should also consider that Togo's message to Sato on July 17th requesting he continue contacting the Soviets said, "Please bear particularly in mind, however, that we are not seeking the Russians' mediation for anything like an unconditional surrender." An historian can easily understand what this meant.

The intelligence estimate generated for the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Potsdam concluded, "... for a surrender to be acceptable to the Japanese Army it would be necessary for the military leaders to believe that it would not entail discrediting the warrior tradition and that it would permit the ultimate resurgance of a military in Japan." Neither the Combined Chiefs nor Truman were willing to discuss terms on that basis. And there has been no evidence since that time to contradict that intelligence estimate. One must remember that the Foreign Office did not rule Japan -- the military did with the silent consent of Hirohito. It was only when Hirohito finally issued his rescript that the war could be brought to an end, and first he needed to be convinced to take such action. He was looking at possibly negotiating a peace in October or later after the Americans started taking unacceptable casualties (for them) as reported by Bergamini and supported by his later statement to MacArthur that the atomic bombs gave him an excuse to surrender earlier than that. Note: he needed an excuse, and losing a few million of his subjects was not sufficient for him to ensure compliance from his military.

The reader must also note the chronology. The Hiroshima bomb was dropped on August 6th, but that didn't catalyze much surrender activity. The Russians declared war on Japan on August 8th, and opened their attack on Manchuria on August 9th, the same day the Nagasaki bomb was dropped. Towards midnight on the 9th, Hirohito called a meeting of the Supreme Council and attempted to get them to accept capitulation. The most that came out of that meeting was a cautious sending of peace feelers through Sweden and Switzerland. On the 10th, Japan suggested it would surrender "... on the understanding that it (the surrender) does not comprise any demand which prejudices the perogatives of the Emperor as soverign ruler." On August 14th, Hirohito decided to issue his rescript by radio announcing the cessation of hostilities. The Americans took this as a surrender, although in the Japanese language version they simply "Ceased to Fight" rather than surrendering. Fighting continued at various locations through August 25th, and the final instrument of capitulation was signed on September 2nd.

With respect to the Soviet attack on Manchuria on August 9th, no doubt that helped Hirohito make up his mind, but it is folly to say that the Soviet attack was the deciding factor. There has been an enormous amount of Monday-morning quarterbacking based on a few statements that were and are still open to interpretation, and the opinions of high officials in the Truman administration who did not understand what was going on in Japan are hardly proof of Japan's intention to surrender without the military's concurrence. In this situation, Hastings is not kow-towing to the American Legion -- he is presenting the most likely case.

The negatives of the book are many, and it is riddled with mistakes. Major Archimedes Patti is listed as Sebastian Patti as an example, and I could fill the review with like errors. It is as if Hastings's researchers were incompetent, but Hastings took their information unquestioningly because small mistakes would not invalidate his arguments and points of view. Maybe not, but the book as is cannot be considered definitive history. One should be warned that many historical details are inaccurate so the reader will not use this book's details as points of reference.

With respect to Hastings's arguments, his constant use of disparaging adjectives to describe MacArthur was jarring. Perhaps Hastings overlooked the fact that MacArthur's forces suffered the lowest casualty rates of any major allied commander. And if MacArthur was wrong in not bypassing the Philippines, what rationale on earth was there for the British campaign to retake Burma? Had Slim's army never moved an inch after Imphal, the war's outcome would have been the same. More tellingly, MacArthur can be faulted for fighting the South Pacific campaign at all. The case can be made that the decision came in the Central Pacific, and the US should have bypassed everything to the south and west of the Marianas and gone straight to Japan. But MacArthur fought the enemy in front of him as he was told to do, initially to defend Australia, then to take the fight to the enemy.

In conclusion, this is an interesting book that will add to discussions of US Pacific strategy and Japan's demise. Please read past the "the British were the experts, the Americans bumbling amateurs with a gift in economic production" attitude. Depictions such as, "Hurley (US General Patrick Hurley) was a buffoon, loud-mouthed and verging on senility" when Secretary Stimson characterized Hurley as "...loyal, intelligent and extremely energetic ... pleasant and diplomatic in his manner..." and a "very fortunate" choice (by General Marshall), seem woefully out of place and should be ignored. The question then becomes, what does the reader ignore? The answer only comes after reading more books by other authors on the subject.

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