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| Retribution: The Battle for Japan, 1944-45 | 
 enlarge | Author: Max Hastings
Publisher: Knopf
Category: Book
List Price: $35.00
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Avg. Customer Rating:  49 reviews
Sales Rank: 3029
Media: Hardcover
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 656
Shipping Weight (lbs): 2.4
Dimensions (in): 9.5 x 6.2 x 1.8
ISBN: 0307263517
Dewey Decimal Number: 940.5425
EAN: 9780307263513
ASIN: 0307263517
Publication Date: March 18, 2008
Availability: Usually ships in 1-2 business days
Condition: DUST JACKET SHOWS SOME WEAR ,BUT IT IS A BRAND NEW BOOK BUT OUT OF SHRINKWRAP,'BOOK CLUB EDITION'.UNREAD,UNOPENED,SHIPS WITH DELIVERY CONFIRMATION,BUY WITH CONFIDENCE,THANKS
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Product Description
Hailed in Britain as “Spectacular . . . Searingly powerful” (Andrew Roberts, The Sunday Telegraph), a riveting, impeccably informed chronicle of the final year of the Pacific war. In his critically acclaimed Armageddon, Hastings detailed the last twelve months of the struggle for Germany. Here, in what can be considered a companion volume, he covers the horrific story of the war against Japan.
By the summer of 1944 it was clear that Japan’s defeat was inevitable, but how the drive to victory would be achieved remained to be seen. The ensuing drama—that ended in Japan’s utter devastation—was acted out across the vast stage of Asia, with massive clashes of naval and air forces, fighting through jungles, and barbarities by an apparently incomprehensible foe. In recounting the saga of this time and place, Max Hastings gives us incisive portraits of the theater’s key figures—MacArthur, Nimitz, Mountbatten, Chiang Kai-shek, Mao, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin. But he is equally adept in his portrayals of the ordinary soldiers and sailors—American, British, Russian, Chinese, and Japanese—caught in some of the war’s bloodiest campaigns.
With unprecedented insight, Hastings discusses Japan’s war against China, now all but forgotten in the West, MacArthur’s follies in the Philippines, the Marines at Iwo Jima and Okinawa, and the Soviet blitzkrieg in Manchuria. He analyzes the decision-making process that led to the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki—which, he convincingly argues, ultimately saved lives. Finally, he delves into the Japanese wartime mind-set, which caused an otherwise civilized society to carry out atrocities that haunt the nation to this day.
Retribution is a brilliant telling of an epic conflict from a master military historian at the height of his powers.
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| Customer Reviews: Read 44 more reviews...
 "I may be crazy, but it looks like the Japanese have quit the war..." * March 18, 2008
134 out of 139 found this review helpful
With age comes a bit of weariness, and I confess that huge books with small print have begun to intimidate me just a bit. But some of them are so well-written and so interesting that page-anxiety drops away after the first couple of chapters. So it was for me with Max Hastings' Retribution.
Retribution, which chronicles the final year of World War II's Pacific Theatre, is a companion to Hasting's Armageddon, a history of the European Theatre's final year. The new volume begins with General MacArthur's plans to retake the Philippines and ends with a quick summary of the war's effects on Japanese society and culture. In between, Hastings examines the infiltration of total warfare into everyday Japanese life; the battle for control of the sea corridors, the Burma campaign and the Aussies who fought it (which I found particularly fascinating, knowing virtually nothing about it); the air campaign over Japan, masterminded by Curtis LeMay (also an especially intriguing chapter, particularly for those who presume that the only big bomb damage in Japan were the nuclear blasts over Hiroshima and Nagasaki); the unspeakably horrific Japanese treatment of China and Manchuria; the ferocious battles on Iwo Jima (to which Hastings devotes an entire chapter); and the behind-the-scenes negotiations that led up to Japan's final surrender.
Hastings punctuates his history of the Pacific Theatre's final year with dozens of stories about individual people whose lives were affected--GIs, sailors, Japanese infantrymen and pilots, Chinese "comfort girls," generals, admirals, statesmen--and this is part of what makes his book such a fascinating read. Moreover, Hastings doesn't pull any punches in his estimation of the war's leaders. MacArthur, for example, comes off as one of the most overrated military leaders ever produced by the U.S. Hirohito also comes across badly. Despite the post-war efforts to paint him as a pacifist overwhelmed by sabre-rattling generals, Hastings argues that the Emperor advocated war right up to the end.
Three things in particular struck me in reading Hastings. The first was that bushido, the ancient code of honor embraced by the Japanese military, made life hell for ordinary foot soldiers, who could be savagely beaten by superiors for little or no reason. Apparently such abuse was seen as a way of toughening up the fighting spirit. Bushido also encouraged disdain for military technology on the part of Japanese officers. "Why do we need radar?" one of them asked. "Do we not have eyes that see perfectly well?" (p. 47) This attitude led to a constant technological lag throughout the entire war.
The second was that the Kamikaze strategy adopted by the Japanese toward the end of the war not only failed in its aim of striking fear and panic into the hearts of Allied sailors, but actually had the opposite effect. Sailors were so enraged by what they perceived as cowardly attacks that their ferocity against the Japanese intensified. As one seaman wrote, "seeing dead Japanese in the water was like making love to a beautiful girl" (p. 173). This is a point worth considering, given the current war on terrorism.
Finally, I was amazed to discover that Japanese civilians were so physically and psychologically exhausted by the war that the US occupation forces actually had to protect Japanese soldiers from their wrath when the war ended (pp. 547-48). Even before the end came, some Japanese were privately voicing reservations about the culture of bushido (p. 264). But with defeat came a desire to leave behind the old culture--to such an extent that only Japan, out of all the war's Axis powers, has refused to acknowledge any war guilt or offer reparations (p. 549).
Hastings' book is well worth reading, either straight-through or selectively. One better appreciates just how daunting a task the island-by-island Allied strategy was, as well as how hopeless (at least when viewed in hindsight) Japan's imperialistic aims were.
________
* A message to Admiral Nimitz from Admiral Richmond Turner, commander of amphibious forces during the invasion of Okinawa. Nimitz's skeptical reply: "Delete all after 'crazy'" (p. 375).
A Pacific War Classic March 19, 2008
64 out of 65 found this review helpful
I became aware of this book on the brink of its UK pubication. The UK title is: Nemesis: The Battle for Japan 1944-1945. I ended up getting the UK edition. I just didn't want to wait for the US edition, so I got it (and I live in Wyoming!). I'm glad I did. Hastings brings forth all his formidable powers, both in research, analysis and in his writing abilities.
Hastings praises the US Navy (especially the Submarine Service), condemns MacArthur (or more correctly, his oversized ego), Bill Slim is seen as one of the war's great captains (though Hastings believes Burma did little to contribute to the defeat of Japan), praises the courage of the Japanese, but damns their cruelty and their leadership's poor decisions.
Retribution is the companion volume to Armageddon. As is typical of Hastings, readers probably won't agree with 100% of his judgements and opinions. But the way he organizes his facts and presents his narrative, he presents a formidable case that's hard to deny.
What sets this book apart from the clear majority of Pacific war books, is that Hastings also has chapters on the war's neglected theaters, China and we see the war as both the Communists and Kuomintang, the Australians and of course, the Soviets. It's not just about the Americans, Japanese and to a lesser extent, the British. American readers may not agree with everything Mr. Hastings writes, but part of what makes him so interesting is that he's brilliantly provocative.
 Riddled with errors June 15, 2008
23 out of 39 found this review helpful
Hastings is one of the best authors of our time, and I have thoroughly enjoyed his previous works. So I eagerly awaited this selection by the History Book Club, in part to see what was advertised as his defense of the use of firebombing and the atomic bombs, a rarity in academe these days, but a position with which I agree. When it did, as I typically do, I did not start at the beginning, but went to what should have been my favorite part of the book, the Battle of Leyte Gulf, to see what novel ideas and theories he has.
And Hastings does have some novel ideas and theories. See if you notice a pattern:
Page 132: "[In October 1944] The Imperial Navy still disposed a force which, a few years past, had awed the world. Of ten battleships in commission at the start of the war, nine remained."
At the start of the war, the Japanese had ten battleships. In October 1944, they had nine. That much is true. The problem is not all of those nine were in commission at the start of the war. Of those ten that were, three were sunk: Hiei and Kirishima were sunk during the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, and the Mutsu sunk after she exploded under mysterious circumstances at Hashirajima anchorage. So seven of that original ten were still in service. Two more were completed after the start of the war: Yamato and Musashi.
Starting on page 132: Hastings calls the Japanese operational plan at Leyte Gulf "Shogo" -- "Operation Victory." I have seen it referred to as "Sho Go," "Sho-Go," "Sho-I-Go" or Sho-Ichi-Go" ("ichi" meaning "one" -- the plan for Leyte Gulf was "Sho 1"). I have never seen it called "Shogo" before.
Page 135: The submarine attack on Kurita's Center Force off Palawan by US submariens Darter and Dace. Hastings says, "This first American success was made possible by a tactical carelessness amounting to recklessness [...]" without giving elaboration. This amounts to a drive-by. In truth, the Darter ended up running aground on Bombay Shoal and had to be destroyed after the crew was taken off by the Dace.
Page 138: Hastings claims that light cruiser Noshiro was sunk by US carrier aircraft during Kurita's transit through the Sibuyan Sea on October 24. During this enounter, the Musashi was sunk and the heavy cruiser Myoko so badly damaged she had to retire.
Page 159: Hastings claims that the light cruiser Noshiro was sunk again on October 26 as Kurita retreated through the Sibuyan Sea. In truth, this was when the Noshiro was actually sunk. She was undamaged during the attacks on October 24.
Page 144: Hastings touches on the entire "Fuso-Yamashiro thing" -- the controversey over which battleship was sunk where in the Battle of Surigao Strait. Hastings claims that Jesse Coward's eastern destroyers launched torpedoes and at 3:08 am "heard a single explosion aboard a Japanese ship, probably Yamashiro." He later states that a torpedo from the Monssen of Coward's western destroyers left the Yamashiro "crippled," and continues:
The next American destroyer attack, by Squadron 24, probably achieved two hits. It is still disputed whether battleship gunfire or torpedoes were responsible, but what is certain is that the battleship Fuso, laid down in 1912, caught fire and broke in two after a huge explosion. Bewilderment persists about how readily such a hugh ship succumbed, but senility plaintly rendered it vulnerable.
The Fuso-Yamashiro controversy involves whether or not the Fuso took a torpedo hit at about 3:09 am (Hastings says 3:08) from the destroyer Melvin of Coward's destroyer group. No one that I am aware of has alleged that Yamashiro took that torpedo hit at that time. Moreover, the account from the Melvin alleged "two large and separate explosions seen." It was Japanese heavy seaplane cruiser Mogami that saw only one explosion.
There is indeed a dispute as to whether Fuso was sunk by torpedoes or gunfire, as Hastings claims, but the dispute concerns whether she took that torpedo and dropped out to explode and break in two, or if it was Yamashiro that dropped out to explode and break in two while Fuso continued onward to face the US battleline where she would receive concentrated gunfire from US battleships and cruisers.
By Hastings' description, Fuso has taken no gunfire, and the tropedo hit that she is believed to have received Hastings instead says was received by the Yamashiro. By Hastings' timeline, Fuso has taken no definite damage. Hastiongs has garbled the controversy and, in the process, garblesd the account of the Battle of Surigao Strait.
Pages 146 and 147: Hastings' timeline of Shima's torpedo atatck is also all wrong. Hastings has Shima launching a torpedo attack on radar contacts that turned out to be the Hibuson Islands (the humor of war), then seeing the two burning halves of the Fuso, mistaking them for separate ships. At that point he turned his force around, during which time his flagship Nachi collided with the Mogami.
What actually happened is that Shima saw the Fuso, mistaking the two halves to be burning ships, and the burning Mogami. Passing the Fuso, he saw the radar contacts and decided to launch a torpedo attack on them while hiding behind the glare of the Mogami. he mistook Mogami to be stationary when she was moving southward, and the Nachi then "skidded" into the Mogami. Aftwer receiving this damage, as well as the earlier torpedoing of the light cruiser Abukuma, and with no definite intelligence aside from the apparent annihilation of Nishimura's force, Shima withdrew.
Page 156: Hastings continually gets the names of two of Taffy 3's escort carriers wrong. He calls the Kitkun Bay the "Kitgun Bay" and the Kalinin Bay the "Kallin Bay."
Page 157: Hastings states the Japanese heavy seaplane cruiser Chikuma was sunk by bombs and aerial torpedoes. He goes on to describe the sinking by Japanese gunfire of the US escort carrier Gambier Bay. Except the Gambier Bay was sunk by the Chikuma; several pictures from the battle off Samar show the Gambier Bay under fire with the Chikuma vuisible in the distance. Hastings messed up the timeline again.
These are just the mistakes and omissions I found in one chapter. Basic things like events, timelines and ship names. Is this the result of poor editing or poor research?
What other factual errors are hidden in this book? Can I trust Hastings general writing, themes and opinions (usally very, very good) when there is so much erroneous with this thin slice?
 Hastings Stumbles April 2, 2008
18 out of 42 found this review helpful
Let me preface my remarks by saying that I am a big Max Hastings fan. I find his writing superb, his narrative riveting and his facts enlightening. However, Retribution misses the mark.
The War in the Pacific is not as linear as the European theatre. No straight line maps work to enlighten the reader of positions and strategy. The messiness of the Pacific campaigns makes writing about it difficult. However, a master like Hastings should be able to overcome these obstacles. He fails to do so here.
So many recently released documents have made for several great recent histories of the Pacific war. Revisionist histories placing more critical light on the failures of Halsey and the role of Hirohito make for important reading. Nothing in Retribution rises to that level. After so many pages of text I found nothing new in Retribution to justify its writing or reading. I expected so much and got so little.
Sure a work by Hastings is important in and of itself to justify purchasing Retribution. However, if you are looking for new insights, prepare to be disappointed.
Great Introduction to WW II and Last Year in Pacific April 1, 2008
14 out of 15 found this review helpful
World War II history books were the first serious books I began reading as a kid. I've probably read over 100 titles ranging from autobiographies (like William Manchester's "Goodbye Darkness" or Saburo Sakai's "Samurai") to "big" history (like Shirer's "Rise and Fall of the Third Reich") and everything in between (especially a lot of those great Ballantine Books from the 1960s and 1970s). The value I see with Max Hastings effort, "Retribution," is that while it supplies well written history, it also reminds us of the past. The book clearly demonstrates that war is brutal, ugly, and vicious and even this "Good War" from the "Greatest Generation" still proves there's no nice way to do it.
I would quibble with Hastings' recurring need to snipe at various historical figures like Douglas MacArthur, William Halsey, Patrick Hurley, and others. He frequently finds fault with decisions that appeared to make a battle worse and that the decision makers should have known better at the time, but because they were vain, arrogant, or incompetent, more people suffered as a result.
For example, Admiral William Halsey has been second guessed for his pursuit of what turned out to be a Japanese decoy force at Leyte Gulf. Halsey directed his naval forces after that decoy, leaving vulnerable other American forces in the area. Those remaining American forces had one helluva fight on their hands when the main Japanese naval force attacked, but they managed to more than hold their own and drive off the Japanese assault. Every history book I've read going back to very early titles published shortly after the war, commented that Halsey at the very least got fooled by the decoy and should have provided better communication to other American commanders in the area. Hastings comments that Halsey should have been relieved of command, but since things turned out okay and it was so close to the end of the war, Halsey's superiors let it go.
My take on this is simple: You're always the smartest guy in the room when it's not your job. Hastings often acts like that annoying backseat driver, Monday morning quarterback, . . . (insert your favorite cliche here) throughout the book, offering these tidy, smart smacks on the wrist of the historical reputation of men who are dead now. Most of the older history books I've read didn't go that far. They noted as descriptively as possible what happened and what people thought they knew at the time and left it at that. Hastings frequently has to weigh in with his wisdom. My concern here is that if this is the only book you'll ever read about this area, you'll come away with a negative opinion of a lot of folks and I don't think that's warranted or fair. Hastings cannot accept the "fog of war" as a legitimate explanation and instead prefers to make attributions to perceived character defects.
This weakness noted, I find "Retribution" to be an accurate, detailed, interesting and complete examination of the last year in the Pacific theater of World War II. You will both understand the "big picture" and you will also have a great deal of emotional connection to all the people, whether Allies or Axis. In particular his chapters on British, Australian, and Chinese actions offer excellent summaries of these nations contributions in what is typically seen as an American-Japanese conflict. Finally, his careful narrative of the American atomic bombing decision is one of the most thoughtful and balanced perspectives I've read. This is a strong book.
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