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| A Path Out of the Desert: A Grand Strategy for America in the Middle East | 
 enlarge | Author: Kenneth Pollack
Publisher: Random House
Category: Book
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Avg. Customer Rating:  8 reviews
Sales Rank: 50015
Media: Hardcover
Edition: 1
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 592
Shipping Weight (lbs): 2.1
Dimensions (in): 9.6 x 6.6 x 1.5
ISBN: 1400065488
Dewey Decimal Number: 327.73056
EAN: 9781400065486
ASIN: 1400065488
Publication Date: July 15, 2008
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 "Tar Baby": America in the Middle East September 4, 2008
1 out of 1 found this review helpful
Take the case of Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche: just about every college freshman has heard of him, most have an opinion of his work, a few have read (or attempted to read) his books and a very small number have an informed opinion, derived from careful study and consideration of his thoughts in context. Analogously to Nietzsche, most everyone, well at least political blog readers, media pundits and avid conspiracy theorists, have heard of Kenneth Michael Pollack. Also analogous to Nietzsche, most have an opinion, but, at least based on my impressions of the majority of internet postings, few have actually read and attempted to understand his thinking. Such is the case with Pollack's latest book, "A Path Out of the Desert: a Grand Strategy for America in the Middle East".
By way of introduction, Pollack, a former CIA Middle East Iran specialist, analyst and National Security Council member in the Clinton Administration, who is now Director of Middle East Research at Brookings, was launched into media attention with the publication of, "The Threatening Storm: the Case for Invading Iraq". That book presented detailed arguments which addressed the problems presented by the Saddam Hussein regime. After careful consideration of the various alternatives, Pollack favored invading Iraq, as this option, which appeared to be the best of those available at the time when considering the level of evidence, presented the most expedient and reasonable method for dealing with the geostrategic problems posed by Saddam's government. Note that nearly one third of "Storm" detailed the likely consequences of military action and gave recommendations for managing the aftermath, namely, the efforts required to stabilize and rebuild the country after the war.
While the administration of George W. Bush chose the military option (an action some attributed to Pollack's highly influential book), it ignored his "grand strategy" for rebuilding the country. The debacle Pollack predicted resulted, along with the expected barrage of public outrage. As a result of Bush Administration actions, now unfairly associated with Pollack, he was promptly tarred with the "neoconservative" epithet by Bush detractors as well as a myriad of anti-war activists. Pollack's commentaries on CNN and elsewhere confirmed his position as an authority on the Iraq War, but simultaneously solidified the public perception of him as a "war supporter". Once that polarizing linkage was established, few troubled to read his subsequent work ("Persian Puzzle" and now, "Path"), but strident opinions on his books abound.
Worse for Pollack, his area of interest, the Middle East, is like the proverbial "tar baby": once touched, you're sort of stuck to it. Of course, the main attraction to the area from a strategic perspective is oil. Despite the fact that the greatest wealth transfer in history is now in progress (presently amounting to around $475 billion/year from oil consuming nations to oil producers) with all it's political and strategic implications, many people, including some influential policy makers, focus on the region for emotional reasons derived from religion. It is indeed an unfortunate fact that the majority of the world's petroleum resources are located in this area and that it is the nexus of 3 major religions, as this incendiary and toxic combination is causing apparently endless troubles.
With that preamble, it is hardly surprising that Pollack's newest book, "A Path Out of the Desert", has generated divisive internet traffic. A highly critical and largely uninformed review of the book was published in "The New York Times" by a commentator for "The Economist" (Max Rodenbeck) on August 22 of this year. Numerous blogs have quoted approvingly of Rodenbeck's commentary but many have done so without evident knowledge of the book itself. This is especially true of the more ideologically oriented blog writers. While this is not surprising, it is unfortunate, as Pollack clearly intended this book for the general reader, many of whom will not now take the time or effort to read the book.
"Path" is written in a highly colloquial manner. The majority of the book consists of a clear and logical synopsis of the problems facing the Muslim countries. Pollack summarizes a vast amount of data, most all of it dismal: burgeoning populations, lack of foreign investment (outside petroleum), bad educational systems, despotic governments, rising frustration from lack of opportunities, under- and unemployment...the list goes on. The causes for the hatred garnered by foreign states that have trodden upon the Middle East (US, Britain) are explained and responsibilities acknowledged and assigned. None of the information Pollack summarizes is controversial: it is all open-source and, in many cases, was published by Arabic analysts, the UN and other international organizations. Lacking an understanding of the problems of the region and their context makes informed perspectives impossible; yet, that appears to be the unfortunate state of affairs for many media and blog critics.
Note that the previous paragraph mentions specifically "Muslim" Middle Eastern problems. By virtue of his tangential association with the present Bush Administration, Pollack has been labeled as an unfettered supporter of Israel by some critics. For this reason, his concentration on the Muslim Middle East might be viewed as prejudicial by some readers. Pollack concentrates on those countries, rather than on Israel as "the problem", as Muslim nations mostly comprise that region and, more particularly, because they have what we want: that, naturally, is oil. That commodity (and maybe a dose of religion) is the source of our involvement and it is this involvement that Pollack argues is the origin of the resentment that is directed against the US.
However, this book is not arguing a particular political position. The point of Pollack's careful exposition of the vast array of problems which invest the region, almost none of which involve Israel, is that foreign interest in the region will persist, tensions will increase and an overall solution will required if the world wants access to oil and economic stability. Despite this, Pollack is careful to acknowledge that US support for that country aggravates our problems in the region, but these problems would exist for us even if Israel did not exist. Pollack further notes that our reasons for supporting Israel do not devolve from an insidious "neo-conservative", manipulative cabal, nor are they derived from Zionist machinations. Rather, they stem from the general American strategy of supporting democratic ideals, worldwide and from US strategic interests. American religious traditions (see, for example, Walter Russell Mead's recent "Foreign Affairs" article on this subject) also figure prominently into our support for Israel. While this last is an important consideration, US support for democracy and support for a stable international order are the crucial issues here. Thus, political reform is the crux of the "grand strategy" Pollack describes later in the text.
Of course, any book which deals with the modern Middle East must address the issue of terrorism, an issue that directly and indirectly involves Islam or Islamism. Pollack makes the case that terrorism is a problem, but it is not the primary problem the US faces in the Middle East. Our interest is oil and our presence is the problem. Until and unless the reliance on petroleum vanishes, the US and (increasingly) other countries will have vital and competitive interests in accessing and protecting this resource and will incur problems as a result.
Pollack attributes the xenophobia encountered in the area to the constellation of social problems endemic in the Middle East: religion certainly plays a role, but, he contends, it is neither the necessary nor the sufficient determinant of the specific problem of terrorism nor of the general resentment toward the West experienced there. The only way to massage the matter to our benefit is to devise a "grand strategy" for dealing with the plethora of problems infecting the Middle East.
Note that Pollack does not place blame for terrorism on Islam. Islam clearly does have an important role, both directly and indirectly, as it provides the ideological framework and justification for many if not most of currently active terrorist factions of interest to us. However, it does not constitute an ideological or theological straight jacket. Within the Arab world there are widely divergent interpretations of Islam, which in turn correspond to very different patterns of behavior. Anthropologists continue to argue about whether the individual's interpretation of the religion shapes the behavior of the individual, or the individual's desired pattern of behavior shapes his interpretation of religion. Clifford Geertz, in his monumental work "Islam Observed" makes a compelling case that religion (in this case,Islam) is modified by communities to suit their culture much more than the introduction of the religion reshapes the culture.
Regardless of the role of religion and it's interplay with Arabic culture, Pollack favors an "operant" approach derived from B.F. Skinner, to wit, positively reinforce the desired "behavior", negatively reinforce those you don't like and you will correct the underlying "problem". It can, and has, also been argued that large populations of young, under- and unemployed men can (and do) foment political and social disorder, so conflicts between religious and ethnic groups can often be traced to more mundane and malleable factors. Pollack suggests this is the case in the Middle East; hence, the "grand strategy" he favors deals primarily with this aspect, rather than dealing with the possible theological and cultural roots of the problem. This is pragmatic, as we can have little influence in the "spiritual" arena, anyway.
At a deductive level, there is nothing about the Quran or the Hadiths that make them especially crippling to economic development or governance in the same way that the Torah, the Gospels, or any other work of religion doesn't necessarily fetter Judaism or Christianity. The problem with scripture is how you interpret it. For instance, the Old Testament sanctions both slavery and polygamy, but neither has persisted in Israeli society (or the many "Christian" countries of Europe and the Americas). Additionally, Muslim countries in Africa do not necessarily demonstrate more problems with development than their Christian and Animist counterparts. Muslim countries in South and Southeast Asia (particularly Indonesia and Malaysia) are doing far better than the Arab states. Muslim communities do not have any problem adapting to (and profiting from) highly developed societies in the United States, India, and elsewhere. These observations suggest that, with the proper support, the Arabic Middle East might also evolve in a fashion congenial to US interests.
Given the constantly changing, but ever vexing, nature of the Middle East, it is difficult or impossible to make highly specific prescriptions or proscriptions for dealing with them. As a result, many of the recommendations made in this book come across as bromides. However, a complex, long-term policy simply cannot be described in detail at its outset. Such a policy evolves over time through a process of cogitation, consultation, discussion, debate, realization and a great deal of trial-and-error as Pollack repeatedly notes. Harkening back to the speech announcing the Marshall Plan itself--or Kennan's "Mr X" article, or Willy Brandt's various speeches, NSC-68, or any other of the foundational documents that helped establish the postwar Western strategy of reconstruction and containment in Europe--you will find them similarly skimpy on details. Even at his most insightful, Dean Acheson himself could not have foreseen the course of containment/reconstruction in Europe at its inception. What is important, and what all of these documents did, was to argue that the strategy was necessary and feasible, and define some concrete short-term steps to be taken.
With these qualifiers in mind, Pollack argues that the "grand strategy" the world (not only the US) must promote in the Middle East is to encourage reform: political, economic and social. Without some fundamental changes in governance, ones which encourage democratic participation (but not necessarily a parliamentary democracy), there is "no exit" from the morass besetting these countries. The case for this approach is carefully and repeatedly made in chapter after chapter. Patience, investment over decades (maybe longer) and occasionally acting through intermediaries will all be required. The maladroit interventions of the G.W. Bush Administration are raised as cautionary standards (the insistence on elections, quite premature, in the Palestinian Authority being a case-in-point).
One point with which I take issue is the recommendation to use Arab military forces as to "stabilize" and "moderate" Arab politics. The
suggestion that the US further support Arab militaries as potentially
"secular", stabilizing and reform-minded forces seems dubious, as their competence and democratic disposition leave much to be desired (caveat: possible exception of Turkey). The role of the Pakistani military, the Interservices Intellence (ISI), in particular, with it's support of militant Islam in the form of the Taliban being a case-in-point.
While Pollack's recommendations seem logical and compelling and ultimately necessary, rather than optional, there is one critical flaw in the reasoning: the American political system and the domestic constituency. The time horizon for successful transformation will be measured in decades or generations, rather than weeks or months. US public opinion has, at
least since the post-WWII Marshall Plan in Europe and the reconstruction of Japan, never tolerated a commitment of this sort (excepting Korea, the "forgotten war" and forgotten obligation). Worse, the lack of American political leadership, one bedeviled by
"focus groups", public opinion surveys and the need for votes, all militate against any sort of long-term measures of the type Pollack advocates. When called upon to sacrifice, the American public is nowhere to be found, even when the investment in time and resources
can be manifestly shown to be in our interest. Rather, the general voter, whether it's the Middle East or global warming wants "something" to be done...but not by me if there is any cost involved. This perhaps feckless tendency, not necessarily unique to the US, is
the crux of the problem.
Paradoxically, the "light on the horizon" in this case is oil, itself. While the time line has been disputed, it seems likely that, at current levels of consumption and considering known and likely reserves, technology, etc, oil will become economically unfeasible to recover in about 40 years. The cost of oil is already having baleful effects on the world economy. Burning fossil fuels is also having dire environmental consequences. Competition for this resource is increasing. Because of these factors, there is some prospect for adoption of the approach Pollack advocates, but it will likely require concerted effort by multiple governments, probably under the aegis of the UN. Once reliance on petroleum products becomes a lesser issue, great power involvement in the Middle East is likely to decrease in scale and the irritation provoked by US presence, at least, is therefore likely to recede.
In summary, this is an excellent and important book. It cogently presents a plan for dealing with the Middle Eastern "tar baby" and, just as importantly, it provides the necessary background materials for understanding the region, it's problems and the need for addressing them. Like "The New York Times", I thought it was notable
work, one of the most important published this year.
Excellent Presentation of Grand Strategy September 5, 2008
1 out of 2 found this review helpful
In this book, the author presents his grand strategy for U.S. involvement in the Middle East. The bottom line is that the author considers the uninterrupted flow of oil from the Middle East as THE vital interest of the U.S. in that region of the world, and that all actions of the U.S. must revolve around protecting this vital interest.
Foremost in his argument is that in order to protect the flow of oil from the region, we must prevent upheavals such as civil wars, Salifist activities - to include terrorism within the region, and violent government overthrows that could ultimately spread to regional conflicts and disruption of oil flow from occurring. Further, he states that to achieve this end, we must help in the reform of the region's governments, educational systems, and economies, among other things, in order to reduce civil unrest and ultimately lead to a more stable region.
Overall, I thought his arguments and ideas were easily understood, well thought out, and supported with facts and data when necessary. Obviously, the amount of resources required to implement such a strategy would require greater thought and more detailed analysis (military forces and money required) based on the specific actions taken to implement this strategy - but as an overarching "doctrine" I think that the author presents an outstanding framework.
I was especially intrigued by the author's last chapter dealing with the future impact that China could play in the Middle East, and the potential difficulties and opportunities that this presents. I also thought that his arguments pointed to the urgency of becoming less dependent on foreign oil - which would provide the U.S. more "breathing space" and options when dealing with the governments of the region. Finally, his detailed ideas for specific actions for the U.S. to pursue with each country within the Middle East are excellent starting points for future discussion and plans.
Overall I think that this is a must read and I highly recommend.
Finding the Oasis In the Desert October 26, 2008
0 out of 1 found this review helpful
The general point 'A Path Out of the Desert' makes, that the US has really no option but to stay engaged in the Mideast and promote Democracy is well taken. Democracy promotion is to be gradualist, work with the various regimes rather than dictating to those regimes, be constant over time, proceed on all fronts, largely eschew military force except as a last resort and is to be a joint project of the US and its allies rather than Washington going it alone. This sounds great but the success of this depends on intelligent execution which has been sadly lacking, a problem which Pollock notes. On another point Pollock says US troops are going to have to stay in Iraq for ten or fifteen more years. That may not be advisable and even if adisable may be impossible. The Iraqis want US troops out. There are no revelatory ideas here and the recommendations reqarding Iraq may be non viable but the 'grand strategy' outlined for the US vis-a-vis the Mideast is on target, I think. The title is a misnomer. This is no path out of the desert. A better title might be 'Finding the Oasis in the Desert'. According to Pollock the US is stuck in the Mideast for the foreseeable future.
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