|
| The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order | 
 enlarge | Author: Parag Khanna
Publisher: Random House
Category: Book
List Price: $29.00
Buy New: $17.24
You Save: $11.76 (41%)
New (35) Used (7) Collectible (1) from $17.24
Avg. Customer Rating:  28 reviews
Sales Rank: 3110
Media: Hardcover
Edition: 1
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 496
Shipping Weight (lbs): 1.8
Dimensions (in): 9.5 x 6.1 x 1.4
ISBN: 1400065089
Dewey Decimal Number: 327.1
EAN: 9781400065080
ASIN: 1400065089
Publication Date: March 4, 2008
Availability: Usually ships in 1-2 business days
|
| Also Available In:
|
| Similar Items:
|
| Editorial Reviews:
Product Description
Grand explanations of how to understand the complex twenty-first-century world have all fallen short–until now. In The Second World, the brilliant young scholar Parag Khanna takes readers on a thrilling global tour, one that shows how America’s dominant moment has been suddenly replaced by a geopolitical marketplace wherein the European Union and China compete with the United States to shape world order on their own terms.
This contest is hottest and most decisive in the Second World: pivotal regions in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and East Asia. Khanna explores the evolution of geopolitics through the recent histories of such underreported, fascinating, and complicated countries as Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Colombia, Libya, Vietnam, and Malaysia–nations whose resources will ultimately determine the fate of the three superpowers, but whose futures are perennially uncertain as they struggle to rise into the first world or avoid falling into the third.
Informed, witty, and armed with a traveler’s intuition for blending into diverse cultures, Khanna mixes copious research with deep reportage to remake the map of the world. He depicts second-world societies from the inside out, observing how globalization divides them into winners and losers along political, economic, and cultural lines–and shows how China, Europe, and America use their unique imperial gravities to pull the second-world countries into their orbits. Along the way, Khanna also explains how Arabism and Islamism compete for the Arab soul, reveals how Iran and Saudi Arabia play the superpowers against one another, unmasks Singapore’s inspirational role in East Asia, and psychoanalyzes the second-world leaders whose decisions are reshaping the balance of power. He captures the most elusive formula in international affairs: how to think like a country.
In the twenty-first century, globalization is the main battlefield of geopolitics, and America itself runs the risk of descending into the second world if it does not renew itself and redefine its role in the world.
Comparable in scope and boldness to Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man and Samuel P. Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Parag Khanna’s The Second World will be the definitive guide to world politics for years to come.
“A savvy, streetwise primer on dozens of individual countries that adds up to a coherent theory of global politics.”
–Robert D. Kaplan, author of Eastward to Tartary and Warrior Politics
“A panoramic overview that boldly addresses the dilemmas of the world that our next president will confront.”
–Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national security advisor
"Parag Khanna's fascinating book takes us on an epic journey around the multipolar world, elegantly combining historical analysis, political theory, and eye-witness reports to shed light on the battle for primacy between the world's new empires."
–Mark Leonard, Executive Director, European Council on Foreign Relations
"Khanna, a widely recognized expert on global politics, offers an study of the 21st century's emerging "geopolitical marketplace" dominated by three "first world" superpowers, the U.S., Europe and China... The final pages of his book warn eloquently of the risks of imperial overstretch combined with declining economic dominance and deteriorating quality of life. By themselves those pages are worth the price of a book that from beginning to end inspires reflection."
–Publishers Weekly
|
| Customer Reviews: Read 23 more reviews...
 bordering on fraudulent July 18, 2008
73 out of 73 found this review helpful
Some of the various, and numerous, factual errors that riddle the book are relatively trivial, but suggest serious sloppiness and disregard for getting facts right. For example, Yugoslavia was not part of Warsaw pact, as Khanna states. Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov was appointed to office in 1992 by Boris Yeltsin, and not by Vladimir Putin. Serbia, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia and Albania are not all smaller by population than Manhattan, and the death toll from the civil wars in former Yugoslavia was not greater than half a million. Other obviously wrong assertions seem to be made up simply to provide lurid background color to Khanna's travelogue: the former KGB headquarters in Moscow has not been turned into "a high-class disco," expensive Moscow malls do not charge entrance fees, and police road checkpoints in Uzbekistan do not stop and check all vehicles. And other gross misstatements of fact display a simple complete lack of understanding the history and culture of the countries of which he writes: the (Orthodox) Uspenky cave monastery in Crimea is not representative of Ukraine's "proud Catholic heritage," Zoran Djindjic was not the first democratically elected leader since World War II in former Yugoslavia , and in the 1980s Yugoslav republics like Bosnia and Macedonia were not richer than Spain. Many of Khanna's wildly wrong claims sound like local myths that he has taken at face value. I can easily imagine some misguided elderly Belgrade resident waxing nostalgically for the days "when every one of our republics was richer than Spain!"
Yet more of Khanna's assertions are not merely factually wrong, but far exceed the ludicrous. In the fast paced and dangerous Russian business world, "one is safe only in the sauna, where everyone is naked and no weapons are allowed." It was news to me to learn from Khanna that every winter "waves" of Russians and "thousands of Ukrainians" freeze to death in "crumbling heatless apartment blocks." And he employs gross mischaracterizations of fact to buttress his claims. For example, according to Khanna, in 2006 Greek GDP increased 25% when the government started to account for prostitution and cigarette smuggling in its figures. In fact, the government said it would include all unreported economic activity, mostly in construction and trade, but including a "small" amount for illegal activities such as smuggling. And this is merely a sampling of patently ridiculous claims.
And for a "foreign policy whiz-kid," Khanna makes numerous and serious analytical mistakes, showing a clear misunderstanding of economics, international institutions, and international relations. The unhedged statement, "Russia's diplomatic position is purely residual," will surely surprise diplomats from Brussels to Tokyo. Noting that Gazprom's market capitalization is $300 billion leads Khanna to the conclusion that Gazprom is one third of the Russian economy, confusing market capitalization with GDP. And his bald assertion that "[n]one of Central Asian legal systems have evolved beyond Kakfaaesque" is belied by the numerous successful legislative accomplishments of Kazakhstan and its quite sophisticated legal code, for example.
But the worst moments of Khanna's book are when he quotes conversations that seem of such dubious authenticity as to make me believe they may be fabricated, or at best the result of very selective reporting, only relating those comments that fit within his pre-existing views. "'Our pride has suffered'" explains a "Moscow intellectual over a narrow glass of [of course] ice-chilled vodka, `but this only drives our nationalism further.'" In Kiev, the locals "give lifts to strangers for a token fare." Why? "We suffered enough together, so we still trust each other." There are just too many such (anonymous) quotations that fail to ring true to trust in the author's integrity. And he also reports statements by national leaders as if they were heard in personal conversation, yet in a curiously implied fashion that suggests otherwise.
A book full of inaccuracies March 12, 2008
60 out of 86 found this review helpful
I bought this book on the basis of a NY Times book review and I was sorely disappointed. When I am faced with a book dealing with the world, I like to start reading the parts that deal with countries and regions with which I am familiar so I can calibrate the author's credibility. In this case I started with the chapter on Turkey (my family came from that country) and I found a melange of opinions and half-truths as well as some outrageous statements. On page 43 we read that "Turkey remains the best model of how islam and modernity can not only coexist but thrive." That is not the impression I get by reading Turkish writers such as Orhan Pamuk or from conversations with Turks I know. The author manages to insult Bulgaria by describing it as a country with "a population shrinking towards five million, ... more in need of a strong mayor than a president". Bulgaria has actually a population of over 7.5 million people (this number as well as others in this review are from Wikipedia) and is not worse off than other countries that emerged from communist regimes after 1990. The author manages also to mangle medieval history. He states in a footnote that the Turkic Seljuk armies defeated the Byzantines in 1071 (so far true) and then he states that the Seljuk armies marched toward Constantinople and Byzantium's only reprieve came from Timur. Well, Timur defeated the Ottoman Turkic state in 1401 so Byzantium must have survived for other reasons in the intervening 330 years!
You may say that I am nitpicking but when I read, for example, the chapters on Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan it is much harder for me to check the veracity of the author's account, so I trying to establish the author's credibility in the areas of the world I know reasonably well. "Ancient" history is particularly useful because its treatises are less subject to political biases than those of modern history.
I went on to read about Egypt and there, on p. 201, I found the following statement: "There isn't a single Arab city free of American or Israeli occupation that is dangerous when compared with a comparable city in the Western Hemisphere." Leaving aside the loaded term "Israeli occupation", there are at least two other issues here: One is that Arab cities can be quite unsafe from what I have heard from travelers. It all depends on what part of the city you go. And what does "compared with a comparable city" mean? Comparable in what way?
Probably I should have stopped there but I went on to read about Iran. The endnote 91) at the start of the chapter (p. 227) caught my attention. "It was Cyrus the Great who liberated Persians from Babylonian rule, even resettling the Israelites to Palestine in the sixth century B.C., seeking to create a buffer between itself and Egypt." To start with, the Persians were never under the Babylonians, Cyrus united the various Persian kingdoms and the Medes around 550 BCE and conquered Babylon in 539 BCE. Cyrus was killed in 539 BCE and his son Cambyses conquered Egypt. Ezra did not lead the Israelites back to Israel until the middle of the fifth century, after Egypt had become part of the Persian Empire. And of course Israel remained a Persian territory and did not become a state with an army until the Maccabean revolt, about 300 years later. Last, but not least, the use of the term "Palestine" is an anachronism. It was used for the first by the Romans, more than 300 years later.
The jacket of the book states that last year the author was a "senior geopolitical advisor to the U.S. Special Operations Command". Maybe the use of advisers like him explains the blunders of U.S. policy in the Middle East.
 Tour of the world in concise but precise terms March 30, 2008
38 out of 77 found this review helpful
This is an extraordinary book, a tour of the "real" world where the future is being defined. While I respect the reviewer's that have difficulty with inaccuracies or inconsistencies, on balance, in all of my reading as reviewed on Amazon, I would rate this one of the top 20 books, perhaps even one of the top 10 (let's go with that, making it one of the top 10 on reality, while my other "top ten" would encompass world changing, social entrepreneurship, the Tao of democracy and other solution-oriented writings).
My notes must of necessity be cryptic. I will start with the bottom line and urge the Amazon reader to take my notes as a strong incentive to buy and read the book cover to cover.
Bottom line: US has screwed up big time, and is taking third place to China's achievement of globalization on its terms, using consultation, incentives, and efficient/effective agreements to propel itself past Europe, which has consensus model that has displaced the US but cannot compete with China's global juggernaut. The US is gently tarred with confusing "security" for prosperity or legitimacy, with preferring single-party strong-arm partners, and with being generally clumsy, inept, ignorant, and hence losing on all fronts.
+ Second World is internally divided between rich and poor sectors
+ Second World is the tipping point domain that will determine the tri-polar (China, Europe, US) outcome
+ Author covers five regions 1) east of Europe including Russia and Turkey; 2) Central Asia; 3) South America with little attention to Caribbean; 4) Middle East; and 5) Asia and the 4 Chinas.
Early on the author states that the Americas are terribly ignorant of both the old and new geography, and I would agree while emphasizing that the "expert" advisors to Presidential candidates are themselves as ignorant (or biased)--from those that are state-centric to those that are ideologically unbalanced to those that believe their ego and social network are sufficient in and of themselves. Not a single one of them knows how to lead a nation-wide conversation, much less a regional or international conversation--they are the "walking dead" of the pyramidal era, and any contender that listens to them and allows them to exclude the iconoclasts and the avant guarde is destined to be neutered, so to speak, before their time.
+ According to the author, America is now viewed as destabilize, in an era when the Second World judges legitimacy on the basis of proven effectiveness (one could also add: sustained effectiveness, not a US forte). Further on the author drives this point home by saying that success trumps ideology, and across the Second World, democracy is not considered practical (nor credible as a US claim for access).
+ European Union is the standard bearer for both technology and regulation (another book I have reviewed pointed out that USA has become a "dumping ground" for products from China Europe will not admit--thank you, Dick Cheney).
+ USA, EU, and China have no common culture, and (combined with the distinct cultures of the other four emergent regions), this is cause for concern about future misunderstandings and over-reactions.
+ The world is demographically blended and so increasingly inter-dependent that the day of major war is indeed likely to be a thing of the past.
+ In the early focus on Europe, the author quotes a European to the effect that Europe is expanding, each time getting poorer, but each time delivering and buying priceless stability. This is one reason why Eastern Europe is skyrocketing and at the same time, displacing the USA as a source for many exports to Europe.
+ He tells us that Europe is confident, incentivizes its partners, has a generation in charge that is transcendent, and is disdainful of the US for its ineptness.
+ Russia is described as a "Siberian Saudi Arabia" but with an insecure nuclear arsenal. of the wealth is centered in (controlled from) Moscow while 2/3 of Russians are living at the poverty line or below.
+ Russia is being emptied of Russians as they vote with their feet and move west, at the same time that Chinese are moving north into Siberia, which global warming is making more hospitable.
+ In the Balkans instability threatens Europe, but European agro-technology is making a huge difference, as is the European penchant to support multiple parties rather than any single dictator. Still, "lurking tribalization" is of concern.
+ Turkey is a key player in saving the Balkans, and in the author's view, is powerful, democratic, secular, and Muslim, and also responsible for ten times more trade with Europe than with the US.
+ Black Sea is creating its own unified region.
+ Georgia does not have a single decent road.
+ Caucasian Corridor is a Balkans waiting to happen.
+ While Brussels is central, London, Ankara, and Moscow each have their own key role in the region.
+ Central Asia benefits from the re-creation of the Silk Road for East-West trade, while also suffering from being the "laboratory" for imperial excess seeking to play the Great Game (not something the US is at all qualified to "play")
+ The author points out Central Asia is at the intersection of Russia, China, Europe, and the US, to which I would add Iran as well.
+ Mongolia is militarily aligned with the US (and from my own knowledge, has one of the finer peace keeping training programs as well as an ideal pre-Afghanistan mobilization training environment)
+ According to the author, China, in sharp contrast to the US and Russia, is making huge gains in Central Asia because of "swift settlement" of all outstanding border issues, its promotion of shared development strategies, its "massive charm offensive" and its role as a "consultative leader," and its being the "standard bearer for business practices" which is code for no-strings attached loans nearing one billion. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is now called the "NATO of the East." China is winning Central Asia through strategy, trade, and co-development. [See also my online memorandum "Chinese Irregular Warfare oss.net"]
+ Kazakhstan has energy and retained its own language, shows promise.
+ Kyrgystan a mess, Tajikistan a bridge for revival of Sino-Iranian trade routes.
+ Uzbeckistan and Tajikistan are Islamic targets.
+ American failure to reconstruct Afghanistan has left Karzai neutered, perhaps soon to go.
+ South America has been suffocated by US hegemony, and US sponsorship of 30 years of "Dirty War" pitting authoritarian rightists against [liberation theology and populist] leftists.
+ Unlike other regions, South America simply wants US to live up to its rhetoric about free trade and democratization, "without exceptions."
+ US threatened by crime, drugs, migration from the South, does not seem to appreciate the value of South American integration and self-sufficiency in energy and food sectors.
+ Four Mexico's--northern, central breadbasket, indigenous destitute isthmus, and very poor Mayan Yucatan.
+ Chaves in Venezuela is a spendthrift and has quadrupled Venezuela's debt, but he actually has a serious strategy that includes China to offset US, a pipeline to Argentina, state to state barter of commodities, modernizing Caribbean energy sector, and welcoming Iran and Europe.
+ Colombia is the key to the future of the region, unique for having Pacific and Caribbean coasts while also being the entry point for a Pan-American highway of greater potential.
+ US is losing the drug war and screwing up the alternatives of trade and economic accelerators.
+ Brazil is the USA of South America, and has formed a trade axis with China. It is multiracial, with the largest populations of Arabs outside Nigeria, Lebanese outside Lebanon, Italians and Japanese outside their own countries. Crime is the wild card, the Achilles' heel.
+ Argentina is a basket case (the author does not tell us that Argentine is also being seduced by Chinese men and is likely to be majority Chinese by 2025).
+ Chile, despite US mis-deeds, benefited from German farmers and is today's success story, focused on stability, pragmatism, and profit.
+ Arabs are redefining themselves in the Middle East in a manner not seen in the past 1000 years. They remain central, and the author anticipates Arab economics will triumph over Islamic radicalism. Later in the book he concludes that the Arabic opinion and sense of self is solidifying.
+ North Africa is Europe's southern shore, and part of the Mediterranean culture, but suffers a massive disconnect between unemployable poorly educated youth and jobs without qualified applicants.
+ Libya (I learn for the first time) is a huge success, with major gains in education, advancement of women, and per capita income over $7000 a year.
+ Egypt as the Arab cornerstone and the difficult blend of Arabia and Islam. This government, the author tells us , "provides neither moral leadership nor public services" and therefore is "a perfect target for Islamist groups well-equipped to provide both." He believes an Iranian-style revolution is possible.
+ The Mashreq--Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, he sums up as "Iranian interference, Syrian intransigence, Lebanese weakness, Israeli aggression, and Palestinian desperation." I was surprised to not see "American idiocy" in there, since my taxpayer dollars are funding the Israeli genocide against the Palestinians.
+ He anticipates the death of Iraq and the emergence of Kurdistan, and here I quote two gifted turns of phrase: "Wars are like a geopolitical reset button." and "The Iraq war exposed the United States as a superpower whose intelligence does not match its aspirations." As an intelligence professional, I must clarify this: both the Army leadership and the CIA professionals, that is to say, Charlie Allen, got it exactly right--no weapons of mass destruction, kept the cook books, bluffing for regional sake. It was George Tenet who parked his integrity on the same shelf as Colin Powell and Mike Hayden, who allowed Dick Cheney to hijack the US Government and send the US military to war on the basis of 935 explicitly documented lies to the public and Congress and the UN, and 25 explicitly documented high crimes and misdemeanors.
+ Iran does not get enough coverage, but that is insufficient to undermine my very high regard for this book.
+ Gulf will provide 40% of the energy for the foreseeable future. Oil windfalls were mis-directed by the leaders, who funded luxuries for themselves, and militaries, rather than seeing to the public good.
+ Wahhabist reckoning is coming--they teach selected elements of the Koran by rote, not Islam. However, they correctly evaluate the Saudi Royals as the near enemy and the USA as the far enemy, joined at the hip.
+ United Arab Emirates is where Las Vegas meets Singapore, with Dubai as the icon. He notes with studied understatement that Chinese goods and Chinese whores are half price to any competing goods or whores, and the former "designed to disintegrate."
+ Malaysia and Indonesia have huge Chinese Diasporas. Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam not as well covered as I would have liked, especially Vietnam which is totally independent of China.
+ There are four Chinas--the southeast quadrant with Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Taiwan (I was surprised to see no mention of Macau, through which China is aggressively wooing all former Portuguese colonies including Brazil); the Beijing centered northeast, and the far edge of Tibet and Xinjiang, which the author tells us earlier in the book are as vital to China as the Rockies and West of the Rockies are to the US.
+ He says that China is "blending" Asia, and that from Malaysia and elsewhere there is broad recognition that a form of Chinese "Monroe Doctrine" is being established. He specifically points out that US offers of "security" are losing out to European offers of "capacity" that nurture prosperity (as well as Chinese offers of co-development).
+ I grew up in Singapore, finishing high school there, and I am in total agreement with the author's admiration for Lee Kuan Yew and the manner in which communitarian trumps democratic when it comes to producing more stability and prosperity. I recently learned from my step-mother, who just left Singapore after decades of being the leader of English education for the government (and Chinese teachers) that one cannot run for Parliament in Singapore without first earning a Masters in Business Administration.
+ Uniquely, Asians want to stay in Asia while visiting everywhere else.
+ He plays down India and I completely disagree with his dismissal of them. India has made more progress than China when one considers the totally divergent and conflictive situations they must handle across tribes, religions, classes, and environmental challenges.
In his conclusion, the author suggests that a tri-polar world now exists, but one read what can only be a list of indicators of USA suicidal tendencies: lousy education, no investment in technology, as many gang members as there are policemen (roughly 750,000 he tells us). The USA can learn to co-exist and co-develop with the rest of the world, and abandon its military "big stick" paradigm, or it can be relegated to third place forever, and gradually go down even further.
I am very worried. I see no one that has strategic perspective, a holistic understanding of the ten threats and twelve policies, nor an appreciation of the urgency of creating an alternative development model for Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Russia, and Venezuela, among others.
See also:
A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility--Report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change
High Noon 20 Global Problems, 20 Years to Solve Them
The Unconquerable World: Power, Nonviolence, and the Will of the People
The Fifty-Year Wound: How America's Cold War Victory Has Shaped Our World
War is a Racket: The Antiwar Classic by America's Most Decorated Soldier
The leadership of civilization building: Administrative and civilization theory, symbolic dialogue, and citizen skills for the 21st century
How to Change the World: Social Entrepreneurs and the Power of New Ideas, Updated Edition
Plan B 3.0: Mobilizing to Save Civilization, Third Edition
The Future of Life
Collective Intelligence: Creating a Prosperous World at Peace
See also the images above (under the book cover).
A Five Star Fraud August 4, 2008
38 out of 38 found this review helpful
Since it appears that only four and five star reviews get prominent placement at Amazon, I have decided to recast my review of this miserable book as a five-star review.
The Second World
Parag Khanna, a Washington based foreign policy analyst, has written a book titled The Second World, part geo-political tome and part travelogue. Robert Kaplan describes it as "a savvy, streetwise primer on dozens of individual countries that adds up to a coherent theory of global politics." Having been generously praised in book reviews in the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the Financial Times, among other publications, I ordered the book with great interest. And as I began to read this book, I was at first shocked, and then increasingly appalled, at a systematic pattern of serious errors of fact, ludicrous assertions that jarred with reality, fundamental misunderstandings of basic economics or history, cheap cliches, and recorded conversations which struck me as obviously fabricated. Every chapter is riddled with astonishing flaws, but here I will simply address those dealing with the Balkans and the former Soviet Union.
Khanna's basic thesis is three-fold. He states the United States, the European Union, and China are the three dominant geo-political powers in the world today. He proceeds to argue that there is a "second world" of countries, belonging neither to the developed "first world" nor to the chronically underdeveloped "third world." And, Khanna writes, the big three global powers compete against one another for geo-political and economic advantage in this "second world," even as they themselves form regional alliances and seek to play the superpowers against one another.
None of these seem to be terribly original ideas. In his preface, Khanna states a wish to follow in the footsteps of English historian Toynbee, who in his retirement took a world tour. And in the second paragraph there is a foreboding of the tone of the book: Khanna states that a "leatherbound first edition of Toynbee's narrative" was his companion on his own world tour. Throughout, Khanna shows a predisposition for smarmy arrogance and condescension. And yet the book is shockingly empty of real insights, even as it boasts an index stretching to twenty-four pages, and an acknowledgment thanking some five hundred people. The impression is that Khanna wants you to know how many important people he knows and how many factoids he can fit into a 500 page book.
Some of the various, and numerous, factual errors that riddle the book are relatively trivial, but suggest serious sloppiness and disregard for getting facts right. For example, Yugoslavia was not part of Warsaw pact, as Khanna states. Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov was appointed to office in 1992 by Boris Yeltsin, and not by Vladimir Putin. Serbia, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia and Albania are not all smaller by population than Manhattan, and the death toll from the civil wars in former Yugoslavia was not greater than half a million. Other obviously wrong assertions seem to be made up simply to provide lurid background color to Khanna's travelogue: the former KGB headquarters in Moscow has not been turned into "a high-class disco," expensive Moscow malls do not charge entrance fees, and police road checkpoints in Uzbekistan do not stop and check all vehicles. And other gross misstatements of fact display a simple complete lack of understanding the history and culture of the countries of which he writes: the (Orthodox) Uspenky cave monastery in Crimea is not representative of Ukraine's "proud Catholic heritage," Zoran Djindjic was not the first democratically elected leader since World War II in former Yugoslavia , and in the 1980s Yugoslav republics like Bosnia and Macedonia were not richer than Spain. Many of Khanna's wildly wrong claims sound like local myths that he has taken at face value. I can easily imagine some misguided elderly Belgrade resident waxing nostalgically for the days "when every one of our republics was richer than Spain!"
Yet more of Khanna's assertions are not merely factually wrong, but far exceed the ludicrous. In the fast paced and dangerous Russian business world, "one is safe only in the sauna, where everyone is naked and no weapons are allowed." It was news to me to learn from Khanna that every winter "waves" of Russians and "thousands of Ukrainians" freeze to death in "crumbling heatless apartment blocks." And he employs gross mischaracterizations of fact to buttress his claims. For example, according to Khanna, in 2006 Greek GDP increased 25% when the government started to account for prostitution and cigarette smuggling in its figures. In fact, the government said it would include all unreported economic activity, mostly in construction and trade, but including a "small" amount for illegal activities such as smuggling. And this is merely a sampling of patently ridiculous claims.
And for a "foreign policy whiz-kid," Khanna makes numerous and serious analytical mistakes, showing a clear misunderstanding of economics, international institutions, and international relations. The unhedged statement, "Russia's diplomatic position is purely residual," will surely surprise diplomats from Brussels to Tokyo. Noting that Gazprom's market capitalization is $300 billion leads Khanna to the conclusion that Gazprom is one third of the Russian economy, confusing market capitalization with GDP. And his bald assertion that "[n]one of Central Asian legal systems have evolved beyond Kakfaaesque" is belied by the numerous successful legislative accomplishments of Kazakhstan and its quite sophisticated legal code, for example.
He has harsh words for the United States, bordering on hysteria. Likewise, he sees the European Union as a beacon of progress and a model for the future. And yet he betrays a clear lack of understanding of EU institutions. For example, Britain does not share with Turkey a similar status of "privileged partner" of the EU, converg[ing] with the EU only when it suits their interests." And while he manages to drop the names of hundreds of obscure statesmen and scholars, there is not one mention of Jean Monnet.
And this awful book is chock-a-block with cheap cliches. Vladimir Putin is a "steely former KGB official." A "Soviet era foreign ministry building" and "Soviet era apartment buildings" alike are "hulking." Here in Moscow, there is a "perpetually insecure business caste that lives each day like its last, partying with exotic lions and dominatrix dancers, complete with plenty of caviar." One must pity the "champagne-soaked, Hummer-driving scions" of Kiev, who must settle for "fancy nightclubs such as Decadence." And "Kiev, like Moscow, is a Potemkin village."
And many of the cliches regarding Russia and Ukraine are not merely examples of poor imagination and lack of writing skill, they are downright ugly. "From cars to construction, if something in Russia works it is probably European." Khanna obviously has not been to any modern Russian manufacturing facilities. He also writes that the Baltic states view "the formerly great Russian bear like an alcoholic uncle, with a mixture f pity and concern." In a stunning bit of cultural hubris, Khanna sneers "Georgians may be Christians, but they are not European in any meaningful sense - no matter how relentlessly they fly the EU flag across the capital city, Tbilisi."
But the worst moments of Khanna's book are when he quotes conversations that seem of such dubious authenticity as to make me believe they may be fabricated, or at best the result of very selective reporting, only relating those comments that fit within his pre-existing views. "'Our pride has suffered'" explains a "Moscow intellectual over a narrow glass of [of course] ice-chilled vodka, `but this only drives our nationalism further.'" In Kiev, the locals "give lifts to strangers for a token fare." Why? "We suffered enough together, so we still trust each other." There are just too many such (anonymous) quotations that fail to ring true to trust in the author's integrity. And he also reports statements by national leaders as if they were heard in personal conversation, yet in a curiously indirect fashion that suggests otherwise. "'To hell with the Russians!' fumed Saakashvili" sounds like reportage of a personal conversation between Khanna and the Georgian president, but I suspect a more honest account would read like "the President was quoted in the Financial Times as saying `to hell with the Russians.'"
And Khanna makes innumerable observations that he believes show particular insight, but are shocking banal if thought over for a mere moment. He notes dryly that Turkey is "a country that has fought wars with nearly all its neighbours." Well, so is France. And in fact just about every country which has been around for the 20th century, or earlier, has fought its neighbours at one time or another. He also notes with immense concern that "Russian and Chinese firms now control most of [Uzbekistan's] mineral deposits." It doesn't seem obvious to Khanna that Russia and China are quite natural trading partners and sources of foreign investment.
Overall, just about the worst book I've ever read, and exceedingly dishonest to boot.
What about India? March 6, 2008
34 out of 62 found this review helpful
This is the book I have been waiting years for - it is the clearest picture I have yet seen of the 21st century's nascent Great Game; the Game as played by three Great Powers with very different styles: the United States, the European Union, and China. Khanna has developed an original view of a tripolar world, and effectively balances the force of geopolitics with the complementary trend toward globalisation.
The book has several persistent and gnawing weaknesses. Khanna persistently focuses on traditional land power geopolitics, an easier thing to describe and a well trodden path in International Studies, but perhaps an increasingly less potent matrix with the emergence of new realms of competition in this century: low Earth orbit (mentioned briefly in one paragraph of the book); the emerging Internet culture and electronic world; enduring naval power and new oceanographic frontiers; the growing diasporas and transnational, nomadic elites who owe no geographical national allegiance. In particular, he who rules lower Earth orbit rules the planet, regardless of who predominates upon the "World-Island" of Eurasia.
The author, like many intelligent NRI Indians, seems disillusioned by the failure of Indian democracy to overcome poverty and wealth disparity on the subcontinent (at one point stating, "It could be argued that China is a freer country than democratic India", ignoring some obvious differences in number of political prisoners, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, free access to the Internet . . . ). Though often pointing out the environmental and cultural devastation that Chinese dominance has visited on its satellite countries, Khanna as frequently stumbles in his lavish praise of the authoritarian Singapore model that China is now following, hinting that China will allow a free society once it has acquired enough wealth, and understates the potential power of chaotic, creative, "undisciplined" (read: free) India and "Bollystan" (Khanna's term) in this century.
Freedom of speech and protection of a counterculture are more than just abstract features of a Western liberal morality. Freedom of speech and protection of "deviants" comprise essential economic infrastructure in the twenty-first century. As we move into an Information Age, societies that offer strong protection of freedom of speech and individual expression will trump those Confucian societies that emphasize obedience and silent submission to authority. As unlikely a winner as oft-benighted India may seem to be, I would still put good money on India and the individualistic U.S., in collaboration with the European Union, as the future leaders of the non-local sphere of Information and Cyberspace, leaving the Confucian societies not yet visited by glasnost far behind. Freedom of information should be treated by Khanna as one of the most important traits of an economic superpower, far more important than good roads, canals, and oil rigs. Confucianism, as it exists today, is a mimicry engine producing only commodities; free societies such as India have the potential to become creativity engines, producing entirely new economic niches.
Unless we are driven into a new Dark Age by war or resource disasters, the relentless Information Age will reward societies with strong creative classes (Richard Florida's term); reward societies with a protected counterculture and bohemia; and will punish societies ruled by conformity and fear of "deviance"; will punish societies without their equivalent of Mad Magazine; will punish societies that imprison dissidents. Until Chinese glasnost emerges, the United States, Europe and India will rule cyberspace, and hence the future.
India will not be destroyed by wealth disparities. The caste system will provide structural stability for some time to come, giving India a prolonged safety interval in which to grow a strong middle class. India is a nation of jatis, but a nation nonetheless. Its diversity and syncretic ability to adapt and absorb culture is a strength that the Chinese lack.
One final point before I go. Khanna's occasionally obsequious praise of Singapore-style authoritarianism is almost matched by the fault of his dismissive critique of United States foreign policy. As another reviewer has stated, the only reason the European Union can focus on building networks and economic bridges is that the United States is providing all the muscle. Without U.S. military presence, the EU would find itself much constrained and forced to be the "bad cop" more often. This is in no way an endorsement of what I agree is largely clumsy and inappropriate U.S. policy, but how the U.S. got to this point is much the result of an inadequate European security policy.
The book, on balance, is a good start.
|
|
|
Powered by Associate-O-Matic
| |
